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ABSTRACT 
 
Endogenous Trade Protection under Regional Trade Agreements: 
 
The Andean Case. 
 
(May 2005) 
Gustavo Sanchez Bizot, B.S., Venezuelan Central University; 
M.S., University of Southampton, UK 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David A. Bessler 
 
Endogenous tariff formation has been the subject of theoretical studies that attempt to 
determine the fundamental economic variables that influence the structure of industry 
protection implemented by international trade policy makers. An empirical analysis of 
endogenous tariff formation under the framework of a regional trade agreement 
implemented by the Andean Community Group is offered in this dissertation. 
Econometric models for the group’s common external tariff (CET) and for individual 
country tariff deviations with respect to the CET are estimated. The analysis is based on 
cross-sectional industrial and trade data for 1996, collected at four digit level of 
aggregation. The level of aggregation refers to the specific definition of industrial sectors 
included in the International Standard Industrial Code (ISIC). While previous studies on 
another regional integrated group in South America (MERCOSUR) use data at the three 
digit level, the aggregation used in this research implies a significant increase in the 
  
iv 
sample size, and also a more homogeneous specification regarding the composition of 
the industrial sectors under analysis.  
 
The causal links among the variables are obtained by using the directed acyclical graphs 
(DAGs) approach. This allows for a refined search for causal relationships. The 
approach is particularly appealing for the analysis of endogenous trade protection since 
it allows analyzing economic systems that involve policy intervention.  
 
The empirical analysis supports several of the classic theoretical models on trade 
protection. The results are consistent with the equity concern model, which suggests that 
governments tend to protect industrial sectors that employ a significant number of low 
wage unskilled workers. The estimated models also support the interest group and the 
adding machine theoretical formulations. However, a rather interesting result derived 
from the DAG analysis is the feedback interaction that seems to operate between tariffs 
and policy variables. The current literature restricts the estimation of trade protection by 
imposing tariffs as the dependent variable with no reverse effect from this variable to the 
policy variables. Our results challenge this unidirectional causality view, since an effect 
from tariffs to the policy variables shows up in most of the estimated specifications. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of regional trade agreements has increased steadily since World War II. 
However, in the last decade there has been a sharp rise in the number of agreement 
notifications to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Between January 1995 and April 
20041, there have been around 160 agreements notified, compared to around 120 
notifications during the previous 47 years2. With respect to multilateral negotiations, 
Winters (1996) concludes that regional agreements have the benefit of achieving strong 
gains from trade de-restriction, and of accomplishing greater liberalization, albeit only 
within the group members. He argues that “we don’t know yet” whether regional trade 
agreements will encourage or discourage global free trade.  
 
While regional integration between industrialized countries has brought about 
indisputable benefits, experiments with regional integration in the developing world 
have been more problematic. The risk of South-South integration, i.e. integration among 
developing countries, is that the losses due to trade diversion outweigh the gains due to 
trade creation3, given member countries’ small relative size and limited intraregional 
trade. Cernat (2003) evaluates seven South-South integration agreements and finds 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
 
1
 A partial list of these agreements includes AFTA, CAN, CEFTA, EC, GCC, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA. 
2
 Notifications before 1995 were submitted to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs organization 
(GATT). 
3
 See figure 1 in the appendix for an illustration of potential gains and loses from regional integration 
agreements 
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evidence of a net trade creation effect for five of the seven regional groups analyzed. 
The only exceptions were MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, which reduced 
trade with non-members during the period 1994-98. 
 
A common external tariff (CET) is a fundamental element of a customs union, a regional 
agreement that not only includes free trade among member states but also a common 
external trade policy. The Andean Community, whose origins date back to the Cartagena 
agreement in 1969, initially had counted on forming a customs union by 1980. In reality, 
a CET was not enacted until 1995, when the Andean Community (CAN) became an 
“imperfect” customs union, with a large list of exceptions, a member country that 
doesn’t participate (Peru) and another with special treatment (Bolivia). The Andean 
Community is an interesting case study of integration between developing countries, and 
in particular, of the process of “open regionalism” currently underway in Latin America.   
 
The object of this study is twofold. Firstly, to apply the results of the theoretical 
literature on endogenous tariff formation to the Andean Community’s Common External 
Tariff (CET), and to identify the determinants of the CET and its political viability. 
Secondly, to apply the directed acyclical graph (DAG) approach to policy analysis where 
causality is a significant issue in determining how different countries’ interests can be 
reflected in the CET. If the Andean CET appears to reflect the underlying political 
economic variables, one would expect less political challenges and a greater possibility 
for the CET to survive. If, on the other hand, the CET does not appear to be determined 
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by the political economy in the region, we may not expect the customs union to be 
politically viable.  
 
The dissertation is offered in five additional chapters. In Chapter II theoretical aspects 
concerning endogenous trade policy are presented. Also the primary variables that have 
been identified in the literature as influencing protection levels are discussed. In Chapter 
III a brief count of the main issues associated with the creation and evolution of the 
Andean Community is offered. In addition, the major characteristics of the common 
external tariff (CET) implemented by the group are discussed. Chapter IV presents the 
econometric tools employed in the empirical analysis, as well as, the formulation of the 
base model used for estimation. In the first two sections of Chapter IV relevant concepts 
associated with the directed acyclical graph (DAG) approach are discussed, particularly, 
the possibility to derive an econometric specification based on the causal flows 
determined in the DAGs obtained by applying an algorithm that searches for causal 
connections, the PC algorithm. Chapter V describes the data and the empirical results. 
The study concludes with a summary and a brief analysis of the implications of the 
empirical results. 
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CHAPTER II 
 ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY 
 
In order to support the selection of the variables included in our empirical analysis, 
theoretical fundamentals related to endogenous trade protection are presented in this 
chapter. The chapter also offers a discussion on the conceptual approach by Hendry 
(1995), where the econometric work is considered at four different levels of knowledge 
about the data generating process. This discussion is relevant to support our hypothesis 
that causality between the policy variables defined below and the levels of tariffs does 
not necessarily follow the unidirectional pattern assumed by the standard theoretical 
models, which do not consider a feedback from tariffs to policy variables.     
 
Literature Review 
 
The basic finding of traditional trade theory, which states that free trade is superior to 
protectionism, is in sharp contrast to the reality that all countries practice some degree of 
trade restrictions. According to the political economy of trade policy literature, 
protectionism is determined by the interaction of different groups of economic agents. 
This literature is very rich and consists of a variety of different approaches. Six are 
discussed here: 
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1) The pressure group framework  (see Olson (1965), Pincus (1975) and Stigler 
(1971)) states that domestic capitalist groups exert political influence demanding 
trade barriers to protect specific economic sectors. The pressure may be 
characterized by collective actions, such as financially supporting election 
campaigns; threatening to have members vote as a block, writing bills and making 
legislators support the approval of those bills, among others. Olson (1965) 
suggests that there is an incentive for “free rider” behavior when the collective 
actions may benefit a sector or group with a significantly large number of 
members. This situation could lead to less effective functioning of the pressure 
group. On the contrary, a small number of members as well as geographical 
concentration would enhance the potential benefits that the pressure group can 
achieve. This theory reflects an inverse relationship between tariff levels and 
industrial concentration, since a small number of firms in a particular sector 
increases the marginal benefit from collective actions and, therefore, fewer firms 
will have the incentive to adopt a free rider behavior. 
2) The adding machine model is based on the assumption that the government will 
establish a protection structure that maximizes its re-election possibilities. 
According to Caves (1976), the government not only considers the number of 
voters represented by a particular sector but also the multiplier effect derived 
from “the publicity impact, on regional and/or economic neighbors of the sector 
considered” (see K A Koekkoek, I. Kol and L.B.M. Mennes  (1981)). This theory 
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suggests that the higher the number of employees in an industrial sector, the 
higher the level of protection set by the government on that sector. 
3) The equity concern model (see Baldwin (1984a), Constantopoulos (1974) and 
Fieleke (1976)) argues that government actions may be directed to protect those 
industries that hire a significant number of low-income workers, in an attempt to 
reduce income inequalities. Even though low-income workers may not have 
enough political power to organize collective actions directed to claim benefits, 
society expects a non-selfish behavior on public policy issues. However, some 
criticisms to this approach are related to the fact that it is not necessarily the case 
that the protected industries transmit the benefits to their low-income unskilled 
workers, since the skilled workers may get the major gains in those sectors (see 
Baldwin (1984b)). On the other hand, some of the sectors with higher protection 
levels have low barriers to entry, which increases the incentive for new 
incumbents and, therefore, reduces part of the gains derived from government 
protection. According to this model we would expect wages to be negatively 
related to tariff levels, since industrial sectors with large numbers of low income 
workers will be strong potential candidates for higher protection levels.  
4) The Status Quo model explains protectionist structures by adopting the 
conservative social welfare function in Corden (1974). This function is consistent 
with aversion to drops in income for any established group. The basic idea is that 
people prefer to maintain current conditions, even if there may be some potential 
gains from a new structure that would arise after the changes in the levels of 
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protection. It is easier to identify the losers in the expected new situation, than to 
identify prospective beneficiaries. According to this model past levels of 
protection are relevant to explain the current tariff levels. This model is not tested 
in this study. 
5) Recent theoretical work has focused on the development and estimation of 
structural economic specifications of endogenous trade protection. The median-
voter model (see Mayer (1984)) considers a structure based on the fact that 
governments increase protection in those industries where the median voter owns 
less capital than the mean ownership; therefore, most people would favor trade 
policies biased towards protecting labor. Implementing empirical analysis based 
on the estimation of the median-voter model has been restricted by the lack of 
data on the median-voters’ characteristics. This model is not investigated in the 
current study. 
6) The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model offers an alternative structural 
specification that is more versatile for empirical testing. The model is motivated 
by the interest group argument and it is based on microeconomic foundations. 
The formulation begins with the specification of preferences for a set of uniform 
individuals. Indirect utility functions are aggregated to generate a welfare 
function that becomes one of the arguments in the government optimization 
problem. The second argument of the government objective function corresponds 
to the contributions provided, through lobbying activities, by the owners of the 
production factors. The trade policy will result from the maximization of the 
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government’s objective function, which explicitly includes a trade off between 
the two arguments described above.   
 
It is important to note that most empirical studies on the political economy determinants 
of trade policy have focused on the case of industrialized countries, in particular the U.S. 
(for the United States, studies include Pincus (1975), McPherson (1972), and Ray 
(1981)). In general, developing countries have always been more protectionist than their 
more developed counterparts, even though this situation has been changing. Latin 
America, in particular, has undergone a process of trade liberalization over the past 
quarter century. Empirical studies on developing countries have historically been limited 
by the lack of data. Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) consider the political economy 
determinants of trade policy in the MERCOSUR countries, in particular with respect to 
the union’s common external tariff (CET). 
 
Ray (1981) searched for the empirical determinants of trade protection using four digits 
aggregation data on U.S. industries. While he didn’t find evidence of a significant 
influence of industrial concentration on the tariff levels, his results supported the equity 
concerned argument, since tariffs were affected by labor intensity and also by the 
capital/labor ratio. His results may be summarized by his estimated linear equations of 
tariff levels as the dependent variable and labor intensity, and the capital labor ratio as 
independent variables. The signs, as expected, were positive for the former variable and 
negative for the latter. 
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Using the same data as Ray (1981), Marvel and Ray (1983) attempted to explain the 
changes in the interindustry trade restrictions generated after the Kennedy Round of 
tariff negotiation, which implemented a 50% tariff reduction between 1968 and 1972. 
These authors found evidence supporting three major effects on tariff levels. The first 
effect was a positive impact of the level of industry concentration on tariff levels; this 
result was consistent with the pressure group argument. The second major effect was an 
inverse impact of the industry growth rate on the levels of protection, supporting the 
comparative advantage argument that indicates that less protection is demanded by a 
particular sector as the ratio of exports to imports increases. The third major effect 
supported the pressure group hypothesis, since as the number of workers belonging to 
labor unions increased, the protection provided to the sector was higher. Marvel and Ray 
also found slight evidence supporting the status quo model, as they found that the fifth 
lag of the tariff turned out to have a positive significant coefficient, implying that current 
tariff levels were a relevant factor in determining any modification on the pattern of 
trade protection. 
 
In a study based on U.S. cross-sectional data Baldwin (1985) found an inverse effect of 
wages and a direct effect of labor per unit of output on tariffs. These results support the 
equity concern and the status quo models, since the government tends to increase 
protection in sectors hiring low-income unskilled workers, who would experience severe 
adjustment conditions if those sectors were less competitive due to protection reduction. 
Baldwin also found evidence supporting the pressure group theory since the tariff levels 
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were also affected by industrial concentration. On the other hand, the variables related to 
external commercial trade (e.g. import penetration) were not relevant in his estimation of 
the tariffs equation. 
 
Different researchers have empirically tested the Grossman-Helpman model. Goldberg 
and Maggi (1999) using data on U.S. industrial sectors at the three digit aggregation for 
1983, found evidence supporting the interest group argument, since import penetration 
was relevant to explain trade protection in those sectors that tended to be better 
politically organized. Calfat, Flores and Ganame (2000) tested the Grossman-Helpman 
model with data for MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). These 
authors estimated equations for the common external tariff and for deviations from the 
CET, their results also supported the interest group hypothesis, since a significant effect 
of import penetration on trade protection was found, for those sectors that were better 
politically organized. 
  
The analysis performed in this study attempts to look at the different fundamental 
relationships between tariff levels and policy variables, but leaves open the search for a 
data generation process, whose causal structure will be explored by a directed acyclical 
graphs analysis. This leads us to the discussion below concerning levels of knowledge 
associated to model discovery. 
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Following Hendry (1995), there are four levels of knowledge available to researchers.  
The first level (probability theory) corresponds to the unrealistic case where the 
researcher knows the full theoretical probability distribution of the data generation 
process (DGP). In the typical random assignment experiment example of flipping a coin, 
we would know the exact conditions of the coin and that each flip is independent of the 
others, therefore, we would know the exact probability distribution for the results of the 
experiment. At the second level (estimation theory) we know that there is a coin that has 
two sides, and that each flip is independent of the others, but we don’t know whether the 
coin is perfectly balanced and, therefore, we need to perform the experiment a number of 
times in order to estimate the probability distribution. In the next level of knowledge 
(modeling theory) the available information is even less, since we only know that there 
is a coin, but we don’t know whether it is perfectly balanced or whether each flip is 
independent of the others. Thus, in order to estimate the DGP we need to record the 
results of the random experiments each time we observed that the coin has been flipped. 
The final level of knowledge (forecasting theory) is related to the fact that once the 
model has been estimated, interest is focused on the prediction of the next occurrence, 
but at this point it might be uncertain whether the coin still exists or even if the 
determinants of the DGP associated with the random experiment remain the same. 
 
It could be said that most of the theoretical and empirical analysis on endogenous trade 
protection discussed above is located on the borderline between Hendry’s second 
(estimation theory) and third (modeling theory) levels of knowledge.  Modeling trade 
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protection is on the second level, because there seems to be consensus about the 
existence of a relationship that goes from the policy variables to the tariffs levels. 
However, such modeling is also on the third level of Hendry’s structure because it is not 
completely known what are the right determinants of the tariff levels, since with more 
than one theory explaining the same causal effects, it is not clear which ones may be 
supported by the parameter estimates obtained in an empirical exercise. 
 
The plan of this study is also in line with the current econometric approach that searches 
for the influence of a set of policy variables on the levels of trade protection. In the very 
early stages of our search on the causal structure associated with the system of variables 
we observed a strong signal of a feedback or even a reverse causal directionality from 
tariffs to the policy variables. These results showed up in most of the causal structures 
estimated throughout the empirical analysis. Therefore, the evidence seems to contrast 
with the standard assumption of a unidirectional impact in the model estimation of 
endogenous trade protection. Following Hendry’s levels of knowledge approach it may 
be relevant to focus the discussion on his third level of knowledge about model 
specification when estimating endogenous trade protection. We can say that, in fact, 
there is a DGP involving several or all of the policy variables and tariff levels; however, 
it may not be certain that the standard theoretical connection from the policy variables to 
the tariff holds. Rather, the association among all the variables may need to be revisited. 
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Expected Effects of Policy Variables on Trade Protection 
 
 In our analysis we will follow the Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998), and present a list of 
general predictions that follow from the literature. For further discussion of each policy 
variable (PV), see Rodrik (1995).  
 
In general, the level of protection in a given industry is higher when: 4 
 
1) Industry concentration (IC) is high. This result is due to the theory of collective 
action (or pressure group theory), first developed by Olson (1965) and later by 
Pincus (1975) and Brock and Magee (1978). According to this theory, even though 
an action may be in the best interest of a group, it is not necessarily in the best 
interest of an individual. The incentive to freeride, whereby an individual may 
prefer to let others act and enjoy the benefits for free, reduces the incentive to act, 
with welfare reducing effects. This collective action problem can be solved when 
the group is small and/or well organized; in fact in this case each individual 
receives a significant portion of potential benefits, and therefore, will have a 
greater incentive to participate. 
 
2) Import penetration (IMPPEN) is low. In general, consumer and producer 
preferences are at odds with respect to import protection for any given good. 
Whether protection is granted (and the degree of such protection) depends on the 
                                                 
4
 See the appendix for the construction of the variables. 
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relative weights ascribed to consumers and producers in the government’s social 
welfare function. In the case of low import penetration, the relative weight of 
consumers will be lower with respect to producers, and it is more likely that 
protection be granted. However, the pressure group model suggests an opposite 
direction for the effect of this variable on tariffs. To this respect, Gawande and 
Khrisna argue that lobbying activities will be developed by those in the domestic 
import-competing sector, and the government will then increase protection to 
maintain the income levels of individuals in those industries. 
 
3) The fraction of industry production used as an input in other industries (INPUT) is 
low. This also follows the pressure group model, and is based on the idea of 
lobbying rivalry: if industry A uses inputs from industry B, industry A will be 
against any protection in industry B, as it would increase the price of its finished 
goods. According to this argument, intermediate goods receive less protection than 
finished goods. Greater protection for finished goods is also a result of Olson’s 
collective action theory, given that, in general, consumers of finished goods 
constitute a large and badly organized group. 
 
4) Salaries (WAGES) are low. According to the equity concern model, the 
government often takes steps to avoid economic changes that affect low-income 
workers. This theory has been put forward by Ball (1967), Constantopoulos (1974), 
Fieleke (1976), and Baldwin (1984a), among others. Furthermore, it is thought that 
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governments try to minimize labor adjustment costs when deciding to reduce 
protection levels during multilateral negotiations or to increase protection levels in 
the face of import threats. 
 
5) Intra-industry trade (TRADECTA) is low. Different theories explain this causal 
relationship. Firstly, according to Cadot et al. (1999), when intra-industry trade is 
high, import demand elasticity is high for domestically produced goods (given the 
higher number of substitutes). Following Ramsey’s taxation rule, these goods 
should be taxed at a lower rate. Secondly, Marvel and Ray (1983) argue that intra-
industry trade is empirically concentrated in intermediate goods. Therefore, in 
general, producers are more efficient at lobbying for protection (according to 
Olsen’s collective action theory). Finally, Levy (1997) makes the case that intra-
industry trade tends to have less distributive effects than inter-industry trade (intra-
industry trade benefits all, while inter-industry trade necessarily creates losers, 
following the Stolper Samuelson theorem). Therefore, in the case of intra-industry 
trade there will be relatively less social conflict and lobbying pressures for 
protectionism. 
 
6) The ratio of industry labor with respect to total labor (LABUNION) is high. 
According to the adding machine model, so named by Caves (1976), a crucial 
determinant of the level of protection granted to an industry is its voting strength. 
If elected officials tend to favor industries with the greatest number of voters, 
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protectionism should be positively correlated with the relative number of workers 
in the industry. This will be even truer if unions are well organized. 
 
7) The labor/capital (LABCAP) ratio is high. This argument is tied, in part, to that of 
the equity concern model explained in point 4, and, in part, to the adding machine 
model mentioned in 6. Furthermore, according to the status quo models of 
protection due to Corden (1974) and Lavergne (1983), governments tend to wish to 
maintain the status quo, protecting industries that have historically been protected, 
in part because of their underlying production structure. Lastly, according to the 
adjustment assistance model elaborated by Cheh (1974), governments wish to 
avoid large adjustment costs, often tied to the necessity of relocated and retraining 
large numbers of workers. 
 
Fundamental theoretical models on endogenous trade protection were briefly outlined in 
this chapter. The policy variables described above correspond to the most common 
factors that affect tariffs levels, according to that literature. Other variables, such as 
foreign tax credit and the number of firms have also been used in empirical applications. 
Also, the two main branches of the current literature have incorporated additional 
variables in their structural specification, income inequality in the case of the median-
voter model, and a dummy indicator to account for sectors organized into a lobby in the 
case of the interest group model. In the following chapter we offer a brief description of 
the Andean Community Trade Association. 
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CHAPTER III 
 THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY5 
 
This chapter briefly summarizes the main aspects related to the historical evolution of 
the Andean Community. Some of the major decisions are presented, and important 
figures related to the CAN members’ international commercial trade are presented.  
 
The Andean Community’s origin dates back to the Cartagena agreement in 1969, which 
set the basis for the conformation of a regional economic group with the objective of 
promoting balanced development under fair conditions, through cooperation in social 
and economic areas. The initial members were Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Chile. In 1973 Venezuela joined the group, while in 1976 Chile opted out. The 
agreement attempted to develop a regional integration for a group of countries with an 
almost non-existent intra-community commercial trade (approximately 2% of the total 
international CAN members’ commercial trade)6.  
 
Among other prospective policies, a regional financial institution was created in1968, 
the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). The institution was created in order to 
promote integration by moving economic resources to the public and private sectors of 
the country members. In 1980, the implementation of a common external tariff (CET) 
                                                 
5
 This summary is based on the official document by The Andean Community General Secretariat “35 
años de Integración Económica y Comercial: Un Balance para los Países Andinos”. May 2004 
6
 The European Union began the regional integration with 30% intra-community trade, and MERCOSUR 
with 10%. 
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was established. However, the excessive protectionist policies (including imports 
substitution and several trade barriers) during the years preceding and following the 
agreement did not allow the custom union to effectively begin its operations.  
 
After a period where unilateral liberalization trade policy was adopted by most of the 
countries in Latin America, the members of the Andean group regained interest in the 
formation of the customs union and the CET. In 1991 it was decided that a free trade 
area and a CET would be adopted in January, 1992. However, it was not until February 
1993 that the free trade area began to operate (with the exception that Peru joined the 
free trade area in July 1997), and November 1994 that the CET began to operate (with 
preferential treatment for Bolivia and, again, with the exception that Peru did not 
subscribe to the agreement).  
 
The CET was adopted with a tiered structure of tariffs at four basic levels: 5%, 10%, 
15% and 20%. In general, protection levels increase with the degree of processing of a 
product. For some products in the agricultural sector, an ad valorem tariff is changed 
depending on the volatility of the international prices. The tariff (a band system) is 
augmented whenever the international price is below an established price floor. It is 
reduced to zero when the international price is over an established price ceiling.  
 
The current CET includes several exceptions. Peru and Bolivia have only two levels of 
tariffs (12% and 20% for the former; 5% and 10% for the latter). Ecuador is allowed to 
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deviate by 5% with respect to the basic structure for around 900 products. In addition, a 
“zero list” grants exemptions to 34 tariff lines7. These are primarily related to education 
and health goods. With respect to goods not produced in the region the members can 
reduce the tariff up to 55% in the case of primary and capital goods; these exceptions 
represent 34% of tariff lines (2227 tariff lines). 
  
In January 2002 the Andean Group presidents established December 31, 2003 as the new 
date for the implementation of a recent modification of the CET. The new CET attempts 
to reduce the dispersion in the tariff system, although it still would keep the same five 
levels of tariff considered in the previous CET. The preferential treatment for Bolivia 
would remain in place, as well as the exceptions for the automobile industry and the 
band system for agricultural product prices. However, the new CET implied the 
participation of all of the five members8, which in conjunction with the lower dispersion 
would reduce the triangulation problem9 generated by the implementation of different 
individual country tariffs for imports from nonmember countries. The date for 
implementation of the new conditions has been moved on three occasions and currently 
it is set for May 2005. 
 
                                                 
7
 Tariffs lines are referred to the specific level at which the tariff is defined. Most tariff lines are defined at 
the lowest aggregation level of the industrial classification, which corresponds to the product level . 
8
 Peru would be partially incorporated with a consensus of around 62% of the universe of tariffs and 96% 
of the total intra-community exports. 
9
 Triangulation occurs when two members of a regional free trade area assign different tariff levels to a 
specific product. Non-member exporters sell the products to the country with the higher tariff, but ship the 
goods via the country with the lower tariff.  
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It is important to notice that the CET has made progress toward trade reform, which the 
individual Andean countries begun in the mid 1980s. In the 60s and 70s, inspired by 
models of import substitution, high levels of protection and government intervention 
characterized trade policy in Latin America. As in other Latin American countries, 
tariffs in the Andean countries were high, with high rates of dispersion; further, and non-
tariff barriers abounded. Beginning in the mid 80s, Latin American countries reduced 
their tariffs, eliminated most non tariff barriers and in general liberalized markets10. On 
average, regional tariffs fell from approximately 80% in 1972 to 13.5% in 2000, while 
maximum tariffs decreased from an average of more than 80% in 1985 to around 30% in 
2000. Non-tariff barriers, which affected approximately 40% of imports, were almost 
completely eliminated by 2000. The evolution of the individual countries’ tariffs is 
shown in figure 2. 
 
In terms of commercial trade, the regional integration has achieved an important increase 
on the intra-community trade; by 1976 it was around (4%) twice as much as before the 
initial agreement. During the 1980s an external debt crisis significantly affected Latin-
America. Trade among the CAN members stayed around 4% during the entire decade. 
However, the implementation of the free trade area in 1993 and the common external 
tariff in 1995 help to increase the intra-community trade to levels above 10% by the mid 
1990s (see figures 3 and 4 for the evolution of exports by destiny and imports by origin 
during the 1990s). These changes in trade patterns among the CAN members can also be 
                                                 
10
 Examples of non-tariffs barriers include: quotas on the number of goods imported, customs or 
administrative procedures, safety standards, among others. 
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observed in figures 5 and 6 where the average annual growth of exports and imports 
shows high levels during the 1970s (right after the initial implementation in 1968); then, 
a period of almost zero growth during the eighties (due to the external debt crisis) 
followed by a significant increase to levels around 10% in the 1990s. This 10% level has 
remained during the current decade, while the increase in trade with the rest of the world 
has risen at a around 6% after the 1980s. 
 
An additional issue concerning future actions and perspectives for the Andean 
Community corresponds to a free trade agreement signed in December 200311, between 
the CAN group and the other important integrated trade group in the region, 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). With respect to this potential 
future integration, the ability to identify endogenous characteristics corresponding to 
each of the two blocks would be of significant relevance. Although some empirical 
studies have been performed for the MERCOSUR group, we have found no evidence of 
empirical analysis for the Andean Community. Scandizzo and Arcos (2003) assessed the 
political viability of the Common External Tariff of the Andean Community by 
computing and evaluating the industrial and commercial indices associated to the 
variables formulated in II. This last study did not include any empirical estimation 
connecting the policy variables and the tariff levels. 
 
                                                 
11
 In May 2004 there was a meeting between the CAN members and the European Union. The meeting 
established the initial steps for an association agreement that would include a free trade area between the 
two blocks. 
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Summing up, three main stages are observed in the evolution of the regional integration 
of the Andean Group. The first period began immediately after the initial agreement 
signed in 1969, there was a quick, although small, increase in the intra-regional trade but 
excessive tariffs and non-tariff barriers did not allow an effective integration beyond the 
timid increase in trade. During the late 70s and the 1980s, there was no apparent 
progress on the community integration. Nevertheless, unilateral reductions of trade 
barriers implemented by each of the CAN countries began to set the conditions for an 
increase in the potential benefits to be obtained from more coordinated actions by the 
members of the group. During the 1990s, the third important period began with the 
effective implementation of the free trade area and common external tariffs. The intra-
regional trade has increased at a higher rate than in the previous period. New potential 
benefits are expected from the possibility to negotiate trade agreements as a block with 
other regional groups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 THEORETICAL ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
 
The main theoretical aspects related to the empirical implementation in this study, are 
considered in this chapter. The first issue corresponds to an analytical device, directed 
acyclical graph (DAG), designed to search for causal relationships among a set of 
variables. The general approach and the specific algorithm used here, PC-algorithm, are 
presented in the next section. Then, the following section discusses the cases where the 
causal graph suggests the use of instrumental variables to account for simultaneous 
determination, or omitted variables, in the causal connection between a pair of variables.  
The final section of this chapter presents the two basic equations that relate tariffs to the 
policy variables involved in the determination of endogenous trade protection. 
 
Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAGs) 
 
A theoretical formulation attempts to explain relationships related to a particular sector 
of the economy with a set of equations. An accompanying narrative is offered in terms 
of social and economic behavioral explanations. While building their analysis 
economists explicitly postulate hypothetical causal relations that policy makers expect to 
use in order to affect the variables that would allow them to achieve certain economic 
goals. 
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Pearl (2000) criticizes the recent year’s econometric textbooks tendency to concentrate 
on algebraic and statistical properties of the structural equation modeling (SEM), leaving 
aside the explicit causal interpretation that he attributes to the SEM founders. Pearl 
writes of the early econometricians: “qualitative cause-effect information could be 
combined with statistical data to provide quantitative assessment of cause-effect 
relationships among variables of interest” (Pearl, 2000, p.135). 
 
 Directed acyclical graphs (DAG) provide a communication device that allowed Pearl to 
elaborate on his interpretation about the fact that the equality sign (“=”) originally used 
by SEM founders was expected to express a structural causal association rather than a 
simple algebraic equation. Particularly, it is considered that the linear equation 
εβ += xy *
 expresses an “ideal experiment” where the parameter  is obtained by 
externally controlling x.  This situation implies an asymmetric treatment of each side of 
the equation, which differs from a regular algebraic equality sign. 
 
The present study attempts to determine a set of model specifications consistent with 
directed acyclical graphs. Here causal flows are established among the variables 
corresponding to the general formulation explaining the CET, and to the analysis of each 
of the individual country tariff deviations from the CET. The construction of the DAGs 
is based on conditional and unconditional correlations that will be used to determine 
edges graphically connecting those pair of variables. The actual search procedure, PC 
algorithm, was developed by Spirtes et al. (1991). 
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The PC algorithm is a development of computer science oriented to produce a graphical 
device that represents a causal structure among a set of variables. In recent years the 
approach has been introduced in the economic area with particular emphasis on the 
search for contemporaneous causality to determine the structure of the Bernanke 
decomposition used for structural VAR (SVAR) analysis (See Bessler and Lee (2002) 
and Yang and Bessler (2004)). In a Monte Carlo simulation analysis, Demiralp and 
Hoover (2003) evaluated the effectiveness of the PC algorithm as “an effective data-
based tool in selecting (or at least narrowing the equivalence class of) the 
contemporaneous causal order of SVARs”. Their findings were particularly promising 
when the true data generating process have causal links that are moderately or 
significantly strong. 
 
The PC algorithm begins with a diagram connecting each variable to all other variables 
with no directed edges. The algorithm continues in two stages. In the first stage 
correlations between each pair of variables are evaluated and edges corresponding to 
zero correlation coefficients are removed. An iterative edge elimination process based on 
vanishing partial correlations of order i (i=1 to n-2) results in a diagram where a subset 
of variables remain connected but no direction is defined. In the second stage every 
triple of three connected variables is analyzed in an attempt to assign direction of causal 
flow. The criterion for the directionality is stated as follows: for every three variables 
connected X – Z – Y, if the first order conditional correlation rXY.Z0 then the right 
orientation is X  Z  Y. The algorithm investigates all such triples. Once all have 
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been evaluated, then if a triple remains such that X  Z – Y, X and Y are not connected 
and there is not arrowhead at Z, then orient X  Z  Y. The last step of the second 
stage consists in orienting any two variables X – Y as X  Y if in addition to the 
directed edge between X and Y, there is a path from X to Y through a set of intermediate 
connections where all the arrowheads consistently point in direction to Y until this last 
variable is reached by the path. 
 
The entire analysis for determining edge orientation rests on the idea that inverted causal 
forks (XYZ) imply a different correlation structure than do causal chains 
(XYZ) or causal forks (XYZ). In particular, for causal inverted forks 
(XYZ) the unconditional correlation between the outside variables (X,Z) will be 
zero, while the conditional correlation between the outside variables given information 
about the middle variables ((x,z/y)) will be non-zero. For causal forks and causal chains 
these conditions are reversed. 
 
Three assumptions are required to support the use of PC algorithm to find DAG 
structures among a set of variables. First, we assume causal sufficiency. That is, there is 
no omitted variable, say z, that causes at least two included variables in the study. This 
assumption does not require that we include all causal variables associated with every 
variable in the study, but only that we do not omit a variable that causes two or more 
variables in the study. If, for example, we find a causal path running from variable X to 
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Y, X  Y, but we erroneously omitted variable Z, which in fact is responsible for the 
observed error. So the true causal structure X ZY, is masked by not observing Z. 
 
The second assumption upon which PC algorithm sits is the causal Markov condition. 
Here we assume that the underling probability distribution generating the observed data 
can be factored by conditioning each variable on just (and only just) its causal parents. 
So for example, if the underlying causal structure is XYZW, the joint probability 
distribution on X, Y, Z, W is given as: 
 
P(X,Y,Z,W)=P(X)*P(Z)*P(Y|X,Z)*P(W|Z) 
 
Here exogenous variables X and Z are represented by their marginal distributions P(X) 
and P(Z). Variables Y and W, require conditioning on their immediate parents, P(Y|X,Z) 
and P(W|Z) and not grandparents or other genealogical relatives (here there are not 
grandparents) 
 
The final assumption to support PC algorithm is faithfulness. Here we assume deep 
parameters do not cancel out, thus giving false signals in correlations between variables. 
Consider the case in figure 7: X causes both Y and Z with coefficients 1 and 2, and Z 
causes Y with coefficient 3. If 1= -23 faithfulness is violated. Here if 1= -23, 
correlation between X and Y will be zero and PC algorithm will remove the edge 
between X and Y, even though in the true model X causes Y. 
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The DAG structure can be helpful in model specification as illustrated below. Figure 8 
shows a DAG where wages and industrial concentration are both affecting individual 
country tariffs deviations from the common regional tariff, and wages affect industrial 
concentration salaries. The diagram in figure 8 allows us to explain the concepts 
involved in the identification of the causal structure that form the basis for the 
specification. This diagram describes the data generating process that fundamentally 
determines the behavior of the dependent variable. Let’s assume that we are interested in 
knowing the effect of industrial concentration on the individual countries deviations 
from the common tariff. Based on the DAG in figure 8, if we regress tariff deviations 
(X4) on both industrial concentration (X1) and the firms’ average size (X3) we would be 
blocking the effect of the first variable (X1) by including the latter (X3). This situation 
describes the front door path criterion according to which we should not include 
descendants of the X variable to estimate its effect on Y (Pearl (2000), p.82).12   
 
In addition to the front door path, there might be a set of arrows that connect the 
included explanatory variable X to the dependent variable Y, through a different indirect 
path that also leads to Y. This case is illustrated by wages (X2), which leads to the 
common tariff through the firms’ average size and is actually connected to industrial 
concentration. Thus, if we want to measure the effect of industrial concentration (X1) on 
deviations from the tariff (X4), our final regression should include wages (X2) to block 
                                                 
12
 However, if there is not a priori theoretical restriction on the explanatory variables, then, the DAG 
would indicate that firms’ average size is the parent of X4 and any relevant information from X1 would be 
contained in X3. 
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the back door path, as well as industrial concentration (X1) and not firms average size (in 
order to satisfy the front door path criterion). The recommendation is thus, do not block 
the front door path, but do block the back door path in specifying variables to include in 
a linear regression model. 
 
Instrumental Variables and Directed Acyclical Graphs 
 
The instrumental variable estimator is widely used for models where the assumption of 
independence between the explanatory variable and the error term is not satisfied. Three 
cases can be distinguished where OLS is no longer unbiased because of the violation of 
the assumption above. 
 
i. When there is a lag of the dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation 
and the error term turns out to be serially correlated, the IV method allows for a 
consistent estimator by using an instrument for the lag of the dependent variable. 
 
ii. An alternative situation corresponds to the case when we are aware of an 
unmeasured omitted variable that might be correlated to one or more of the other 
regressors. If there is not an available proxy for the unmeasured variable, its effect 
will be contained in the error term, and, therefore, instruments would be needed for 
the explanatory variables correlated with the omitted variable. 
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iii. The simultaneous equation models represent another relevant case. The interaction 
among some of the variables in the system links the stochastic behavior of the 
dependent variable Y1 in one equation, to the stochastic term corresponding to 
another endogenous variable Y2, which has been included as a regressor in the 
equation for Y1. The IV estimator is performed based on the information contained 
in each single equation; it contrasts with full information methods, such as three 
stage least square or full information maximum likelihood, which take into account 
the correlation across the error terms of all of the equations in the system. 
 
The literature on directed acyclical graphs illustrates the situation where instrumental 
variable is the adequate estimation method. The definition is based on the DAG in figure 
9 (Pearl and Brito 2003): Variable Z is an instrumental variable for X in a regression on 
Y if: 
1. Z is independent of all error terms that have an influence on Y that is not 
mediated by X; 
      and 
2.  Z is not independent of X 
 
The “bow pattern” from X to Y indicates that they have correlated errors because of the 
omission of a relevant variable, and, therefore, OLS regression of Y on X would produce 
biased estimators. In this situation, Z can be used as an instrument for X because it 
satisfies the two conditions above. 
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The use of an instrumental variable estimator is also required when the PC-algorithm 
produces a graph as the one in figure 10. The double arrows between Wages and Tariffs 
indicate an omitted variable connecting those two variables. Two different models can 
be estimated. The first model should have tariffs as the dependent variable and labor 
capital, import penetration, and wages, as the explanatory variables. However, given the 
bi-directed edge between tariffs and wages, OLS will be biased and, therefore, based on 
the DAG structure; input should be used as an instrumental variable for wages in the 
equation for tariffs. The second model should consider wages as a function of input, 
import penetration, and tariff. Similar to the previous case an instrumental variable 
estimator will be required, and according to the DAG structure labor capital will be the 
adequate instrument for tariffs. Several of the equations estimated in the empirical 
analysis presented in Chapter V are illustrative of the situation described above. 
 
Model Formulation 
 
The empirical analysis is based on the partial equilibrium model estimated by Olarreaga 
and Soloaga (1998). The first equation (1) explains the common external tariff by a 
linear combination of the aggregated policy variables corresponding to the Andean 
group members: 
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where:    CETi: Common External Tariff for group i 
     
k jiX , : Policy variable j for group i, country k 
k
iω : Weight for group i, country k.. 
n    :  Number of policy variables 
iε ~ iid(0, 2I) 
 
The second equation explains individual country tariff deviations from the CET, as a 
function of the deviation of the individual country policy variables with respect to the 
weighted average policy variables. 
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where:  kiET : External tariff for group i, country k. 
        
k
iµ ~ (0,2 x ): error term that allows contemporaneous correlation across 
countries 
 
Both equations are estimated based on the results of the directed acyclical graphs derived 
from the PC algorithm. OLS may be used to estimate equation (1) given that the policy 
variables have been considered exogenous for CET, according to the current literature. 
  
33 
However, some contrasting results from the DAG analysis challenge this unidirectional 
effect view; more comments on this are presented in the empirical results analysis.  
 
Equation (2) represents a more complex case and, therefore, a more detailed empirical 
analysis is required. The first aspect to be considered is whether the estimation should be 
carried out separately for each country or, should, the data be pooled to estimate the 
model at the regional level. This issue is analyzed by comparing the out of sample 
forecast performance of the two alternative strategies.  
 
In the case of the regional pooled data the model could be estimated using seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation, this would account for the potential contemporaneous 
correlation associated with the regional economic interaction that influence the group of 
Andean countries. A second alternative would be to take advantage of the two 
dimensions of the data (country and industry) and perform panel data estimation. 
Olarreaga and Soloaga actually combined the two strategies, since they had time series 
data for each of the countries (although at three digit aggregation level). The data 
available for this study is restricted to one year (but for a four digit aggregation level), 
therefore, only one of the two alternatives, SUR or panel data, could be used.  
 
The panel data estimation was chosen for two reasons. First, given the cross-sectional 
characteristic of the data the countries’ unobserved effects seem to be more relevant for 
explaining a set of domestic industrial economic indicators, in comparison to choosing 
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the efficiency gains generated by the correlation of the residuals across the equations 
estimated using SUR. The second reason that led to the choice of the panel data 
estimation was a recurrent result arising from the directed acyclical graphs analysis, 
which showed a different causality structure in comparison to the one represented by 
equation (2). This causality structure implied that more than one equation should be 
estimated for each country and for the region. In some cases it was actually needed to 
use SUR to account for the correlation across the equations for the policy variables.13 
 
This section has presented the econometric specification that includes the fundamental 
variables involved in the empirical implementation reported in the next chapter. The 
causal connection among those variables can be identified by  PC-algorithm as explained 
in the previous section. Once causal links are found, the resulting directed acyclical 
graphs, discussed in the first section of this chapter, suggest the appropriate modeling 
strategy that will produce the parameter estimates of the underlying data generating 
process. Having presented the theoretical aspects related to the model specification and 
the tools used in the search for causal connections associated to the jointly determination 
of the policy variables and tariffs, we now turn to the empirical implementation in the 
following chapter. 
                                                 
13
 This is developed in more detail in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter is divided in four sections. The first section describes the industrial data 
used for the model estimation and discusses issues concerning measurement errors 
frequently present in economic statistics. Notice that, even though panel estimators are 
used in the empirical analysis, the data are cross-sectional. In fact, all of the models 
reported in this chapter were estimated for data corresponding to 1996. However, panel 
estimation was feasible due to the two dimensional characteristics of the data; there are 
around 60 industrial sectors common to the five countries, thus, the unobserved country 
effect was modeled as fixed or random effect.  
 
The next three sections correspond to the estimation of the causal relationships among 
the policy variables and tariff levels. The three sections are similarly structured; the 
causal diagrams from the DAG analysis are presented first, followed by the model 
estimation and the interpretation of the results. The second section shows the estimation 
of the model for the common external tariff in equation (1). In the third section an 
empirical experiment is performed on sub-regional data, in order to select the 
appropriate estimation strategy for the data generating process that involves the variables 
included in equation (2). The final section is devoted to the estimation of the data 
generating process for the complete regional data; this estimation is based on the strategy 
suggested by the analysis performed in the third section of this chapter. 
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Data 
 
The empirical analysis is concentrated on cross-sectional estimation due to restrictions 
on the availability of data.14 However, rather than using a three digit aggregation level 
(as in the recent studies for the Latin-American case) that only allows studying a sample 
size of 27 sectors for a particular year, the present study is performed at a four digit 
aggregation level, which increases the sample to around 60 sectors in all of the 
regressions.15 The larger sample, not only represents an improvement due to the large 
number of observations, but also a refinement regarding the composition of the industrial 
sectors under analysis. This concern emanates from the possibility that some connections 
among the policy variables, as well as their impact on the CET, could be misrepresented, 
given the aggregation of some sub-sectors with different or opposite characteristics. 
  
The estimation of the regional and individual country models are performed on data for 
1996 (one year after the implementation of the common external tariff); however, sub-
regional data for Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador is used for the forecast evaluation in 
the third section of this chapter16. The original sources of the industrial data correspond 
to the national statistic institutes of each of the countries; however, most of the 
                                                 
14
 Olarreaga and Soloaga estimate a panel for the MERCOSUR country members. Specifically they study 
27 groups for 1987 to 1992. In this study the data correspond to a lower aggregation level (4 digits), which 
generates 81 groups. 
15
 For example, at three digits aggregation the ISIC code identifies the beverage industries with the code 
313, while at four digits this industry include the codes 3131-34 corresponding to the four sub-sectors: 
distilling blending spirits, wine industries, malt liquors, and soft drinks respectively 
16
 The data for 1997 is not readily available at four digits aggregation level, in the cases of Peru and 
Venezuela. 
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information has been obtained through the industrial statistics yearbook produced by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which gathers data from 
its country members. The Common External Tariffs were obtained from decision 
number 370 issued by the Andean group, and the data for the individual country tariffs 
come from the Latin-American Integration Association (ALADI) and from the 
Interamerican Development Bank. The imports and exports figures were also provided 
by ALADI.  
 
The industrial data at the four digit aggregation level are reported based on more than 
one homogeneous industrial classification for all of the CAN countries. Therefore, 
conversion tables among three different industrial classification codes were required in 
order to build the dataset used for the empirical estimation.17. In addition, data for 
imports, exports and tariffs were constructed from raw databases containing information 
at the ten digits aggregation of the NALADISA classification code18. 
 
Not only does the data availability represents a factor that affects an empirical exercise 
as the one performed in the present study, it is also important to consider potential 
measurement problems derived from the data itself, particularly, when the measurement 
involves explicit firms’ confidential information as well as figures that are associated 
with policy makers’ performance.  
                                                 
17
 See Appendix B for the conversion tables among the three industrial classifications. (International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revisions 2 and 3; and the NALADISA classification (used for 
the Latin American Integration Association ALADI) 
18
 The ten digits aggregation corresponds to the industrial data at the product level. 
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Nerlove (1958) discusses in detail four main classes of measurement errors. The first 
corresponds to the difference between the conceptual nature of the variable included in 
the theoretical model with respect to the variable that is available for the empirical 
analysis, an example could be the financial credit to the private sector in an equation for 
investment, it is normally the case that this explanatory variable is not directly available, 
rather it has to be constructed as the difference between the stock of financial credit at 
the end and at the beginning of the relevant period. The second source of measurement 
error is the voluntary misrepresentation that could be present due to information 
provided by the observed (maybe due to fears of government intervention) or generated 
by the observer (probably due to political pressures). The third factor corresponds to 
sources of inadvertent misrepresentation that could arise even if the data collection is 
implemented through a well structured sample survey design; some examples include 
non-responses, errors in coverage, and errors in coding or tabulating. The final common 
factor is simply the lack of data availability, frequently present in the data collection 
stage. This implies that statistic adjustments such as interpolation, extrapolation and 
others should be implemented to complete the raw data used for the reports generated 
from surveys.  
 
In the present case all four sources of measurement error may be present in the analysis. 
The first and fourth sources basically affect the construction of some of the proxies used 
as policy variables. Labor unions represent an illustrative example. There is no 
information on the number of workers enrolled in unions and, therefore, the policy 
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variable has to be approximated by the ratio of industry labor with respect to total labor. 
The use of that proxy variable assumes that a large number of workers increases the 
probability of the conformation of unions.  
 
While the second of Nerlove’s sources of measurement error doesn’t seem to be 
significantly affecting the accuracy of the industrial surveys for the CAN countries19, his 
third source seems to be important, particularly at the processing stage, since, even 
though industrial surveys are conducted most of the years in all of the countries, there is 
a significant lag between the actual data collection and the availability of public reports. 
This situation implies that low priority is assigned to processing the surveys and 
producing reports, and, therefore, few resources are allocated to that purpose.20 
 
The Aggregate Common External Tariff (CET) 
 
This section presents the estimation of equation (1).  In the next sub-section the causal 
diagrams obtained from the directed acyclical graph analysis are presented. The causal 
structure and its implication for the model specification are discussed. The second sub-
section shows the results for the parameter estimates of the underlying data generating 
process. Also, non-nested tests are performed to determine whether the data supports the 
                                                 
19
 On the one hand, political pressures are more concentrated on frequently reported data such as inflation 
or GDP; on the other hand, fears of government intervention may be more relevant at the 
commercialization level than at the production level, since governments in the region tend to support and 
protect the manufacture sector. 
20
 In the case of Venezuela, industrial data for the 1997 survey has not been fully processed and, therefore, 
there is no publicly available data at the four digits aggregation level. 
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hypothesis that one or more countries are significantly more influential in the 
determination of the CET. 
  
Directed Acyclical Graphs Analysis for the CET 
 
Figure 11 gives five DAG structures, estimated on 1996 data for the interaction of the 
common external tariff with the aggregated and individual country policy variables. The 
first causal diagram (figure 11.A) shows the structure associated with the specification in 
equation (1), where the CET is assumed to be endogenously determined by the set of 
aggregated policy variables (i.e. CET cannot cause any of the policy variables). On the 
other hand, the DAG structure in figure 11.B was obtained from the same data used for 
the previous diagram, but no restriction was imposed on the causality direction. The 
other three graphs in figure 11 correspond to the evaluation of the causal links when the 
CET is examined jointly with each of the individual country policy variables21. Notice 
that Bolivia and Ecuador are not included because there were no causal links between 
their corresponding policy variables and the CET. As indicated above, PC algorithm is 
used to generate these graphs at a significance level of .10 (as suggested by the Monte 
Carlo experiments of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 2000, p.116). 
 
In general, there seems to be a connection among all of the variables included in the 
analysis. In figures 11.A and 11.B the estimation with the aggregated policy variables 
                                                 
21
 Although not reported here, the DAG analysis also showed an effect from the CET to the individual 
country policy variables when no causality restriction was imposed 
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shows causal diagrams where no variable or subset of variables are isolated; they are all 
connected to one or more variables in the system, and five out of the nine edges in figure 
11.B show a possibility of an omitted variable between the corresponding two variables. 
The DAGs for Colombia (figure 11.C) and Venezuela (figure 11.E) also show a 
significant number of causal links among the variables, whereas in the case of Peru, only 
few connections were determined by the PC-algorithm.  
 
According to the causal structures in figures 11.A and 11.B, wages and intra-industry 
trade are the significant policy variables in determining the CET, although, in the case of 
the intra-industry trade, the causal link with the CET is not present in any of the graphs 
corresponding to the individual countries. In the case of wages, the causal link with the 
CET is also present in the graphs for Colombia and Venezuela but not in the graph for 
Peru. In fact, for the latter country it is the industrial concentration variable that is 
connected to the CET.  
 
Given that the causal diagrams for the other two countries (Bolivia and Ecuador) did not 
show any connection between the policy variables and the CET, the set of results in 
figure 11 provide some evidence that favors the hypothesis that the two largest countries 
in the Andean Community group may be the most influential in determining the CET. 
The fact that the causal link between wages and the CET is only relevant for Colombia 
and Venezuela, may be a reason for the current state of no participation of Peru (since 
the CET may not be consistent yet with its economic structure) and the significant 
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number of exceptions still present in the implementation of the common external tariff 
for the Andean group.  
 
The next sub-section offers a set of non-nested tests for the hypothesis that the policy 
variables of one of the individual countries contain enough information to explain the 
CET. Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) for the case of MERCOSUR, found evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that Brazil (the largest country in that regionally integrated 
group) was the most influential country in the determination of that group’s common 
external tariff. 
  
A rather interesting result is obtained when the analysis is not restricted to the theoretical 
causal structure that imposes the policy variables as exogenous determinants of the CET 
(as in equation 1). In that case (figure 11.B), there seems to be an omitted variable. This 
edge direction from the CET to the policy variables is also present when the individual 
country deviations from the CET is jointly analyzed with the deviations of the individual 
country policy variables with respect to the aggregate policy variables. In this sub-
section we only conduct the estimation based on the restriction imposed by the 
specification in equation (1), which implies that the relevant policy variables will be the 
exogenous explanatory covariates in the equation for the CET. 
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Another result deserves a comment when comparing figure 11.A22 with the causal 
graphs corresponding to Colombia, Peru and Venezuela (figures 11.C, 11.D, and 11.E). 
The edges between input and wages, input and labor union, and labor union and 
industrial concentration seem to be robust in the sense that they appear in all of the DAG 
structures. The last two edges are also relevant in most of the specifications estimated in 
the next section. This set of robust connections may imply some overlap among the 
different theories that attempt to explain trade protection. Input, labor union, and 
industrial concentration are all found in the literature as factors related to the interest 
group hypothesis. The last two are assumed to have a direct effect on tariffs; whereas 
input is supposed to have an inverse impact. Also, industrial concentration and labor 
unions are factors related to the status quo model, although the sign of the effects are 
opposite (as explained in Chapter II). Gawande and Khrisna (2003) comment that “this 
promiscuous relation between variables and theories and the inability of the literature to 
identify variables that would separate models more sharply has precluded the precise 
determination of the relative validity of the different models.”  
 
Model Estimation for the CET 
 
Based on the results in the previous section, four models are presented in table 1. The 
dependent  variables  in  all  of  the  models  are   the  common  external  tariffs,  but  the 
                                                 
22
 No comparison with figure 11.B is commented here, since the estimation of the causal graphs using the 
individual country policy variables were executed imposing the causality direction from the policy 
variables to the CET (as it is the case in figure 11.A). 
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 regressors correspond to the relevant aggregate policy variables in the first equation, 
and the individual country policy variables for Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, 
respectively, in the other three equations. 
 
The results in table 1 show that the explanatory power of the policy variables appears 
low (32%) in comparison to the results obtained by Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) for 
MERCOSUR. This could be an indication of a fundamental weakness of the Andean 
CET: if the tariff structure is not representative of the community political economy, it 
might not be politically viable. 
 
Wages appears to be the most important policy variable affecting the CET. According to 
the social change literature, most governments are dedicated to reducing the degree of 
income inequality in the economy by attempting to raise the living standards of the 
lowest income groups, i.e. most protection will be granted to sectors that employ low 
income, unskilled workers. This would appear to be applicable in Latin America, where 
trade liberalization has brought about an increase in income inequality and in particular 
with respect to the gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Low wage sectors across 
the Andean Community are textiles, clothing, shoes, wood products, ceramic and leather 
products, among others; sectors that in fact benefit from relatively high levels of 
protection. 
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The importance of wages in determining protection across the Andean Community is 
consistent with other empirical studies on the determinants of trade policy. Not only do 
Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) find a similar result for MERCOSUR, but Baldwin (1995) 
finds that wages (together with the labor/capital ratio) are the most important variable in 
determining tariff levels in the United States. 
 
Intra-industry trade is a more problematic policy variable. As seen above, most of the 
literature seems to point to a negative relationship between intra-industry trade and 
protection, while our results point to a positive (albeit small) relationship. Olarreaga and 
Soloaga (1998) also find a similar result for MERCOSUR. The explanation may be in 
the type of goods for which intra-industry trade is present among the Andean countries. 
In general, one tends to identify intra-industry trade with intermediate goods, whereby 
producers’ collective actions would be sufficient to push down protection. In the Andean 
Community, intra-industry trade is relevant in a series of industries that historically have 
been strongly protected: textiles, clothing, shoes, wood products, ceramics, and glass 
products, among others. On the one hand, this represents intra-industry trade in finished 
goods, for which the intermediate good argument does not apply. Secondly, many of 
these goods are crafts goods. Furthermore, some of these sectors, such as textiles, 
clothing and shoes, are subject to high levels of protection in developed countries as 
well, possibly implying a retaliation effect.  
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Non-nested tests23 were performed in order to evaluate whether one or more countries 
were more relevant in the determination of the CET. According to the results in table 2, 
in no case did it appear that the policy variables of a specific country were a more 
appropriate set of regressors compared to the aggregate community variables, with the 
exception of Venezuela, for which the results were ambiguous, although only at the 15% 
level of significance. This result may appear slightly surprising, given that Colombia and 
Venezuela are considered the “core” countries of the Andean Community, and Bolivia’s 
production is a mere 10% of Venezuela’s. Furthermore, regressions using data only on 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela (the three countries to apply the CET) did not yield 
significantly different results than regressions using data on all five countries. 
 
Our major finding from the aggregate of the common external tariff is that wages are the 
most consistent causal variables for the CET. Results for the entire group (CAN) and for 
Venezuela, and Colombia, indicate wages are the most likely direct cause of the CET. 
However, if we relax the restriction that CET can only be an effect and not a cause, we 
find some evidence that an omitted variable may be missing in the link between wages 
and CET. 
                                                 
23
 The J-Test contrast two rival non-nested models. For example, assume two competing models: 
H0: Y = 0 + 1X +  
H1: Y = 0 + 1Z +  . 
The test consists in contrasting H0 vs. H1 by estimating the model in H0 adding the fitted values (	) 
obtained from the model in H1, if 	 is significant H0 is rejected because there is information in the second 
model (H1) that is relevant in the explanation of Y, and that information is not contained in the first model 
(H0). The models are reversed and the test is performed again. When both models are rejected or accepted 
the test is inconclusive. One might as well compare Schwarz loss metrics of Ho and H1 as both have the 
same left-hand-side variable 
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Given these initial results we now turn to an analysis of deviations present from the CET 
and aggregate policy variables. 
 
Deviations with Respect to the CET, and the Aggregated Policy Variables (Sub-
Regional Forecast Evaluation) 
 
In the third section of Chapter IV a brief outline was offered on the set of alternative 
estimation strategies considered for models involving the individual country tariff 
deviations from the CET, and the difference between the country and aggregated policy 
variables. The following sub-sections present an evaluation of those alternatives using a 
sub-regional model for Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador. The results are presented for the 
data corresponding to both three and four digits aggregation levels. This allows 
comparing whether the relationships found at three digit aggregation remain 
approximately the same when the model is estimated with a lower level of aggregation.24 
 
The evaluation is basically carried out by comparing the mean squared errors (MSE), the 
minimum absolute percentage errors (MAPE), and other statistics generally used to 
check forecasting performance. Also, the statistical significance of the difference 
between the MSEs of each pair of models is tested by using the Diebold-Mariano (1995) 
                                                 
24
 The interest here is to get some indication about a potential weakness some the studies performed for 
Latin-American, which use data on three digits aggregation. 
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test. On the other hand, in the case of the pooled data, a Hausman test is performed to 
choose between random and fixed effects estimator.25  
Based on the results for the sub-regional data, the model for the full set of countries is 
estimated in final section of this chapter 
 
Sub-Regional Data Estimation  
 
In order to decide about the best alternative for modeling the individual country tariff 
deviations with respect to the CET and the associated policy variables, the forecast 
performance of four different modeling strategies are compared in this section. The lack 
of data available for all of the countries did not allow performing the analysis with all of 
the five CAN members. The base period for the full model is 1996, but the forecast 
evaluation for 1997 was carried out with only three of the five country members 
(Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador). 
 
Three of the four modeling strategies presented in this section are based on the empirical 
relationships resulting from the directed acyclical graph analysis; the last estimation 
corresponds to what is commonly known as a “straw man” model, which is constructed 
without any structured strategy and it is supposed to be beaten by any systematic 
                                                 
25
 Hausman (1978) proposed a specification test is based on the difference between the two estimators 
( fereq ββ

−=  ). Under the null hypothesis (Ho: the error term in the re model is uncorrelated to the 
regressors) reβ

 is Blue, consistent and asymptotically efficient, whereas feβ

 is consistent, but if Ho is 
false the random effects estimator is inconsistent while the fixed effects estimator is still consistent. 
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modeling methodology. The first modeling strategy consists of estimating individual 
models for each of the three countries in the sample. In the second case the data for all of 
the countries are pooled and the estimation is performed on the regional data. The third 
model is also estimated at the regional level but taking into consideration the 
longitudinal26 feature of the data.  
 
All of the papers analyzing tariff determination and deviations from CETs in the South 
American region are based on a three digit aggregation of the industrial sectors. This 
aggregation generates 27 observations for each country for each year. Two main 
weaknesses motivated the use in this analysis of an aggregation that allows having more 
observations in the sample. 
 
1) On the one hand, there is the standard statistical concern about the small sample 
size. This issue has been managed in previous analysis by pooling the individual 
countries and collecting data for some years, in order to perform panel data 
estimation (see for example Olareaga and Soloaga (1998) and Calfat et al. (2000)) 
 
2) On the other hand, the three digits aggregation may mislead the search for the 
structural association between the country tariffs deviations and the group of 
policy variables. There might be highly different economic structures for the 
variety of sectors aggregated in one code at the three digits level. For example the 
                                                 
26
 Even though we don’t have a cross-sectional time-series data, we refer here to panel data or longitudinal 
estimation since we have two dimensions for the industrial data (countries and industrial sectors) 
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case of grain mills, with a typical economic structure close to perfect competition, 
being in the same group with canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables, 
which is closer to an oligopoly economic structure.  
 
The first aspect is examined in this section by comparing the estimation and forecasting 
results obtained at both 3 and 4 digits aggregation. The second aspect is analyzed by 
comparing the structural specification resulting from the DAGs. Differences related to 
the existence and direction of causality would support the hypothesis that analyses 
performed at three digits aggregation may be misleading in the search for the economic 
structure underlying the data generating process.  
 
Directed Acyclical Graphs Analysis for Sub-Regional Data 
 
The individual country deviations and the group of policy variables are all incorporated 
into the DAG analysis without any predetermined relationship structure. All of the 
models from previous studies are estimated with a predetermined structural effect from 
the policy variables to the country tariffs deviations. In this study, there is not 
preconception on the way the variables are linked, rather the connections among the 
variables are determined by the DAGs. 
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Directed Acyclical Graphs for Individual Countries (for Sub-Regional Data) 
 
The DAGs in figure 12 are presented country-by-country comparing the resulting DAGs 
for the data at three and four digit aggregation levels. In both cases the significance level 
for the tests on the simple and partial correlation coefficients is at around 20%. Monte 
Carlo Simulations performed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000 p.116) suggest a 
20% significance level for samples with less than 100 observations.  
 
It can be observed that, even though some connections among the variables are common 
to the two aggregation levels, the resulting DAGs produce significantly different 
structural relationships among the variables. This seems to be consistent with the 
hypothesis that working at a three digits aggregation level might be misleading the 
search for causal relationships among the variables. 
 
Directed Acyclical Graphs for Pooled Data (for Sub-Regional Data) 
 
Similar results are obtained when the variables are pooled (figure 13). However, the 
connections among the variables at three and four digits aggregation seem to be more 
compatible in this case in comparison to the results obtained for the individual country 
analysis. The significance level for the three digits aggregation was also 20% since the 
pooled data has 81 observations. However, for the four digits aggregation the DAG is 
consistent with a significance level around 10%, which agrees with the level suggested 
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by the Monte Carlo analysis referred above. In this last case the sample has 180 
observations. 
 
Model Estimation for Sub-Regional Data 
 
The models estimated in this section correspond to the specifications suggested by the 
DAGs reported above. In general, all of the equations corresponding to a particular 
country or to the regional data are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression when 
there are not double arrows in the DAG, which imply that there is no evidence of an 
omitted variable relationship. When double arrows are present, instrumental variables 
were used based on our discussion in the second section of Chapter IV. 
 
Estimation for Individual Countries (for Sub-Regional Data) 
 
In order to perform the forecast evaluation in the next section, only those equations 
corresponding to endogenous variables resulting from the DAGs for the regional data 
were estimated. In tables 3-5, the models are presented at three and four digits 
aggregation levels for each country, however, no direct comparison can be established 
since the scale of the policy variables are different due to the aggregation. 
 
In general, it is observed that the relationships derived from the DAG analysis produce 
specifications where the suggested explanatory variables are significantly relevant in the 
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equation for the corresponding dependent variable. However, an interesting result in the 
set of estimated equations presented in this and the following sections, is that whenever 
the DAGs suggested the use of instrumental variables, it was always observed that even 
though the instruments were relevant in the first stage of the IV method (not reported 
here), the instrumented variable was never relevant in the final equation. This result does 
not change whether only the exogenous variables derived from the DAG analysis, or all 
the exogenous variables in the model, are included in the first stage of the instrumental 
variable estimation.   
 
Estimation for Pooled Data (for Sub-Regional Data) 
 
Two specifications are reported in table 6; both models correspond to the estimation of 
the pooled data, but the first was estimated for the data at three digits aggregation, while 
the second was estimated for the data at four digits aggregation.  It can be observed that 
with only one exception, all of the explanatory variables suggested by the DAG analysis 
are statistically relevant at 10% (and most at 5%) in their corresponding equation. It is 
also interesting to observe that the two explanatory variables with lower significance in 
the equations for wages correspond to the ones that are not common for the two 
specifications (tariff for 4 digits and input for 3 digits). 
 
Notice that in the case of three digit aggregation the connection between labor union and 
industrial concentration was not determined, but the model reported in table 6a shows 
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labor union as a function of industrial concentration. Previous studies have used Schwarz 
loss (see for example Yang and Bessler ( 2004)) in order to determine the causality 
direction in those cases; however, in this case it was found that the difference between 
the Schwarz loss functions computed for the models with labor union and industrial 
concentration interchanged (as dependent and explanatory variable) was so small 
(0.00004) that it was decided to use the causal direction obtained for the four digits 
aggregation in figure 13. 
 
The next estimators to be reported correspond to the longitudinal data model. The 
Hausman test was performed in order to determine whether a fixed or random effects 
specification was the appropriate in each case. Table 7 clearly shows that while wages 
seems to be better estimated with fixed effects, labor union is better estimated with 
random effects. In fact, the coefficients for random and fixed effects are pretty close for 
the labor union equations, but not for the wages equation. Moreover, the joint 
significance of the dummy variables in the fixed effects specification (not reported here) 
turned out to be different than zero only in the case of wages. Baltagi (2003) explains 
that random effects are more adequate in those cases where the number of panels is 
significantly high and, therefore, using the fixed effects estimator would produce an 
excessively high loss of degrees of freedom. 
  
The panel data models at three and four digits in tables 8 and 9 show the fixed effects 
estimator for wages, and the random effects estimator for labor union, at three and four 
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digits aggregation level. While the explanatory variables in the models for labor union 
seem to explain a significant portion of the total variation of the dependent variable that 
is not the case for the fixed effects model for wages.  
 
The results for wages look particularly interesting since the regional estimation for labor 
union are pretty similar whether the unobserved individual effects are included or not in 
the specification. In contrast, it can be observed that the significance of the coefficients 
for the wages equation at three digits aggregation differ substantially between the fixed 
effects and the simple regional estimation. While input was not significant in the 
regional estimation, it is highly relevant in the fixed effects model, and the reverse 
happens to two of the other regressors (trade quota and labor capital). At four digits level 
there are similar results, three of the four explanatory variables experienced an important 
reduction in the significance level, actually two of them (tariff and trade quota) are not 
relevant anymore. 
 
Different factors may be influencing the poor results obtained for the fixed effects 
estimation for wages (compared to the simple regional estimation), one plausible 
argument is the fact that the DAG analysis was performed at the regional level without 
taking into consideration the longitudinal features of the data27. In order to contrast these 
particular results, a parsimonious fixed effects model for wages departing from the 
whole set of variables was estimated. This strategy partially follows Hendry’s 
                                                 
27
 No reference was found for applications of the directed acyclical graph approach to longitudinal data.  
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parsimoniously encompassing approach, from general to specific. The estimation in this 
last case (not reported here) did not offer much explanation other than dropping the 
irrelevant variables at the four digits case. For the three digits aggregation case, in 
addition to dropping the irrelevant variables already found in the fixed effects model, 
tariff was found to be relevant. Curiously, this last variable was identified as relevant for 
wages in the DAG analysis at the four digits aggregation; however, tariffs had the 
weakest influence in wages in the DAG28 
 
Forecast Evaluation for Sub-Regional Data 
 
In order to evaluate the different models estimated at individual and regional levels, a 
group of statistic measures are presented in tables 11 and 12. In addition to the three 
models reported above, a “straw man model” estimated without any systematic or 
structural methodology (just including all possible explanatory variables) was 
incorporated in the analysis. This last model was expected to be beaten by most of the 
models constructed with the analytical tools described above.  
 
In terms of specification the “straw man model” was significantly weak when compared 
to the models suggested by the DAG analysis. Most of the variables not included in the 
specifications suggested by the DAGs were not relevant in this naive model (see table 
10); in fact, for pooled data models (regional, longitudinal and straw man) at the three 
                                                 
28
 It was relevant only at 12% whereas all the other connections found among the variables were relevant 
at 5% 
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digits aggregation the relevant variables at approximately a 5% significance level are 
almost the same for the two equations that are used for the forecast evaluation analysis 
(wages and labor-union). Only import penetration (for the wages equation) was 
significantly different from zero for the regional estimation, but not for the straw man 
model. At the 5% statistical significance the additional variables included in the straw 
man models were redundant. At the four digits aggregation the results are similar. The 
only relevant variables in the straw man specification are those suggested by the DAGs. 
All other variables are redundant.  These results seem to justify the DAG analysis 
proposed by Pearl (2000) as a previous step to model estimation, in order to detect the 
causality structure suggested by the data.  
 
In general, based on the mean absolute percentage error, the longitudinal model seems to 
dominate in terms forecasting performance. At the three digit aggregation level, the 
longitudinal model and the individual country model, each has the best out of sample 
forecasting performance for two of the five dependent variables predicted. It is also 
observed that the forecasting performance of the regional estimation is pretty close to the 
longitudinal model, but the latter does better in four of the five analyzed cases. On the 
other hand, the “straw man model” has a forecasting performance that is pretty bad for 
the two equations for Bolivia, it is similar to the longitudinal model in the case of wages 
for Ecuador, and has reasonable good results for the other two variables analyzed (wages 
for Colombia and labor union for Ecuador). The results are shown in table 11. 
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At the four digits levels the individual model has a poor performance for all of the 
models except in the case of labor union for Ecuador. The longitudinal estimation has 
the best performance for two of the four variables modeled. The simple regional 
estimation is again close to the performance of this model. Forecasts from the straw man 
model are better in this case than at the three digits level; its outcomes are also close to 
the longitudinal model in most of the cases.  The results at the four digits levels are 
shown in table 12. 
 
Table 13 shows a summary of the models chosen based on the mean absolute percentage 
error for each of the variables estimated. The longitudinal model seems to be the most 
stable specification in terms of forecast performance; although the simple regional 
estimation and the straw man model have similar forecasts performance as the 
longitudinal model. However, the straw man model is in general parsimoniously 
encompassed by the other two models since, as commented above; most of the 
additional variables contained in the straw man model are not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
An additional analysis on the forecasting performance was carried out by conducting a 
series of Diebold-Mariano tests (1995)29 between each pair of forecasted series. A total 
of six tests statistics were computed for each model, and the results are shown in tables 
                                                 
29
 The Diebold-Mariano test statistic is based on the difference between the results of the computation of a 
loss function for each of the two competing predictions. The loss function used here was the mean square 
error.  
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14 and 15. The Diebold-Mariano tests are more conclusive regarding the comments 
above related to the better results obtained from the pooled data; the individual country 
estimation turns out to be better only in the case of wages for Colombia at the three 
digits aggregation level. In general, the other three models perform better than the 
individual country models but, as was also already commented, there is not clear 
distinction on the accuracy of the forecasts obtained from the regional model, the straw 
man and the longitudinal models. 
 
Pooling the data and estimating regional models looks as an appropriate alternative for 
the search on the connection among the policy variables analyzed in this study. It is 
interesting to notice that in the case of labor union for Ecuador at four digits aggregation, 
the individual country model has the best performance, but in the other three cases its 
performance is rather poor. 
 
The comparison between pooled and non-pooled data estimators has been extensively 
discussed in the literature; Baltagi et.at. (2000) compare a group of models with 
homogeneous parameters across panels (pooled data estimators) with respect to the 
alternative heterogeneous parameters estimator proposed by Pesaram and Smith (1995), 
which estimates individual models by panel and averages the parameter estimates. The 
comparison in the model of demand for cigarette estimated by Baltagi et. al. clearly 
favors the pooled data estimators. In a previous study, Baltagi and Griffin (1997) 
performed an empirical analysis for data on gasoline for the OECD countries. They 
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found evidence for a dynamic model that also supports the use of pooled estimators. The 
forecast evaluation showed that, even though, pooling the data imposes the constraint 
that the parameters are homogeneous across panels, individual panel estimation 
produced inferior results in terms of forecast performance for the OECD data on 
gasoline. 
 
In the search for the possible reasons that generated the poor forecasting results from the 
individual models, it was found that on average the forecast from regional models is 
better, but it could be far away from the actual levels for the whole set of values 
corresponding to one or few variables. This can be seen in Figure 14 where the forecast 
from the simple regional model at three and four digits levels are shown. It can be 
observed that the forecast for the middle observations (which correspond to Colombia) 
are significantly distant from the actual values 
                
Deviations with Respect to the Common External Tariff, and the Aggregated Policy 
Variables (Estimation for All CAN Members) 
 
The results in the previous section led us to consider that the pooled data provides 
significantly better parameter estimates compared to the individual country estimation. 
The DAG analysis for the country tariff deviation will still be presented for the two 
alternatives in order to study the similarities between the individual and the regional 
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relationship structure, however, the estimation is going to be carried out at the regional 
level only. 
 
When individual country tariffs deviate from the CET, what is the cause?  That was the 
original issue to be analyzed in this study, since all of the papers in the literature attempt 
to develop an empirical estimation departing from the theoretical fundamentals 
presented in Chapter II. In fact, Sanchez et al. (2004) performed the DAG analysis 
imposing the causality direction from the policy variables to the tariff deviations. They 
found that, as in the case of the CET, wages and intra-industry trade seem to be the most 
immediate causes for a dependent variable involving tariff levels. However, they also 
reported that when no restriction is imposed on the causality direction, there is a 
feedback or even an opposite direction for the causality structure. 
  
The weak evidence of causality from the policy variables to the country tariffs deviations 
found by Sanchez et al. (2004) may imply that those countries determine their individual 
levels of protection based on considerations outside of the political economy variables, 
and not reflecting industrial structure; rather, this could be the result of powerful 
lobbying forces that succeed in achieving protection for their industry depending instead 
on historical power distributions, for example.  
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Directed Acyclical Graphs Analysis for Full Regional Data 
 
Due to the weak evidence of causality commented on above, the DAG analysis for the 
data corresponding to the full set of CAN members was performed without imposing any 
causality direction. Thus, all of the variables were included without any pre-conception 
regarding the structural relationship.  
 
The directed acyclical graphs in figure 15 show the causal links among the country tariff 
deviations and the policy variables. It is observed that some connections are common to 
all or almost all of the countries. Tariff deviations are mainly connected to trade quota 
and wages, whereas input and industrial concentration are the main source of 
explanation for labor union. Those two relationships are also observed at the regional 
level in figure 15.F. On the other hand, although labor capital and import penetration are 
connected for three of the five countries the causality direction is ambiguous since for 
Bolivia and Colombia the directions are opposite, whereas for Venezuela there is a 
connection between those two variables, but without a specific direction. The regional 
analysis also agrees with the individual analysis by showing an undirected connection 
between labor capital and import penetration. The only slightly incompatible result at the 
regional level with respect to the individual country findings is the connection between 
trade quota and input, which is only observed for Ecuador. 
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At this point it is also interesting to contrast the results in figure 15 with the DAGs 
obtained for the CAN members when the analysis is performed at three digits. It can be 
observed in figure 16, that at the three digits aggregation, there are significant 
discrepancies between the causality structures obtained for the individual countries and 
the one obtained at the regional level. It is also noticeable that at the regional level the 
DAGs for the three and four digits aggregation only differ in the edge connecting trade 
quota and wages, which is present in the former case. This last result may be suggesting 
that those studies that have reported estimated models at three digits aggregation would 
have produce more robust results had the relationships been estimated with the countries 
pooled. 
 
Model Estimation for Full Regional Data 
 
As it was already stated, the results obtained for the sub-regional data led us to conduct 
the regression estimation at the regional level using fixed or random effects to account 
for the unobserved individual country component common to all the industry sectors.  
 
The estimation for wages is performed using fixed effects since the Hausman test in 
table 16 suggests that there is a systematic difference between the fixed and the random 
effects estimators.  
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On the other hand, according to the theory on instrumental variables estimation based on 
directed acyclical graphs briefly outlined in section two of Chapter IV, the DAGs in 
figure 15.F suggest that two equations should be estimated using the IV estimator. One 
equation would be for labor union using trade quota as an instrument for input, and the 
other equation would be for input using industrial concentration as an instrument for 
labor union.   However, similar to the previous experience with the IV estimator for the 
sub-regional data, the results for the two equations were significantly poor. The first 
stage produced reasonable results in the sense that the instruments were relevant as 
regressors for the instrumented variable, but the latter was completely irrelevant for the 
dependent variable in the second stage equation. Therefore, it was decided to estimate 
the relationship considering the causality only from input to labor union, based on the 
fact that for the five countries the edge connecting input with labor union shows a 
causality direction from the former to the latter. The random effects model was chosen 
since the Hausman test suggested that there was not a significant systematic difference 
between the coefficients of that model and those from the fixed effects model. 
 
Interpretation of the Results for the Full Regional Data 
 
The negative coefficient for tariffs in the wages equation (table 17) supports the 
theoretical view of an inverse relationship between these two variables, this result agrees 
with the equity concern model where protection is expected to be higher in those sectors 
with low income unskilled workers. The equation in table 17 also reflects an inverse 
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effect of the labor-capital ratio on wages, this could be explained by the fact that labor 
intensive sectors require a higher number of less skilled workers, which leads to lower 
wages on average; this situation can be expected in sectors such as textiles, clothing, 
ceramic and leather products among others. The coefficient for the last regressor in the 
wages equation (import penetration) implies that the higher the levels of imports for a 
particular industry the lower the domestic wages for that sector, this may be showing 
that more internal competition due to external supply, forces the sector to be more 
competitive and, therefore, the cost of the domestic input factors should be lower. 
 
Table 18 shows that industrial concentration has a direct impact on labor union. The first 
effect implies that the lower the number of industries in a particular sector (higher IC) 
the greater the number of employees30. This may be particularly true for the CAN 
countries where few groups dominate important economic sectors and, therefore, a few 
number of firms employ a significant amount of workers. This situation favors the 
creation of more organized labor unions, since workers are normally concentrated in few 
companies and, in many cases in few geographical areas. 
 
The remaining coefficient in the equation in table 18 shows a positive sign on the effect 
that input has on labor union. This suggests that the higher the value added of a 
particular sector (relative to the total industrial output), the higher the number of workers 
in that industry. This result may be expected given the fact that greater value added 
                                                 
30
 Remember that LABUNION is defined as the ratio of industry labor with respect to total labor:  
    (Number of employees in sector i ) / (total number of employees) 
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should be generated in sectors with higher number of workers, unless the sector 
corresponds to a high technology industry, which is not the case on average for the CAN 
members. 
 
The empirical findings reported in this chapter have been derived from the combination 
of the directed acyclical graph approach proposed by Pearl (1995) and the use of the 
econometric tools consistent with the model specifications suggested by the DAG 
structures obtained for the tariffs and the policy variables of the Andean Community 
group. After considering some issues related to the data used for the empirical analysis, 
this chapter showed the estimation results for the equation corresponding to the levels of 
the CET as a function of the statistically significant policy variables. The last two 
sections were devoted to the search for the causal structure and the econometric 
specification of the data generating process underlying the jointly determination of the 
individual country tariff deviations from the CET, and the deviations of the individual 
country policy variables with respect to the aggregated policy variables. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As stated in the introduction two main issues motivated this study: an analysis of the 
determinants of endogenous trade protection and the use of directed acyclical graphs to 
analyze an economic system that involves policy intervention. The first aspect was 
changed to a related problem because, contrary to the standard literature on endogenous 
trade protection, some of the policy variables that are normally postulated as exogenous 
in the data generating process for tariff levels, where in turn affected by tariffs. It was 
still possible to find evidence supporting some of the theoretical models outlined in 
Chapter I, but the empirical connections found were not directly implied from an 
equation for tariffs. The second aspect not only allowed for the determination of causal 
flows amongst variables, but also to contrast the connections among all of the variables 
for two basic experiments, estimation on three versus four digits aggregated data, and 
regional versus individual countries estimation. 
 
The comparison of the results at three versus four digits aggregation confirmed the 
hypothesis that significantly different economic structures could arise as the relevant 
model in each case. These different structures not only affect the parameter estimates but 
also the causal connections found among the variables. The differences found in the 
empirical exercises performed here were stronger when the models were estimated 
separately for each country. When the data for all of the countries were pooled the 
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causality structures were much more alike. This is perhaps a result, consistent with 
earlier literature, indicating benefits from aggregation (Grunfeld and Griliches 1960). 
These results indicate that if it is the case no data are available at four digits aggregation 
the estimation at three digits should be performed on pooled data. 
 
In reference to the findings related to the endogenous trade protection and policy 
variables, the evidence from the equation for the common external tariff supports the 
equity concern model, since tariffs are negatively affected by wages. This suggests that 
governments tend to favor those sectors that employ a significant number of low income 
unskilled workers as a policy to reduce income inequality. The intra-industry trade was 
also relevant to explain equation (1) but the sign was opposite to the theoretical 
argument that less social conflict and lobbying pressures for protectionism is expected 
when this variable increases. A potential explanation for this result is the fact that a 
significant amount of intra-industry trade among the CAN members is carried out for 
finished rather than intermediate goods.  
 
The results for the models involving individual country tariff deviations from the CET, 
and the deviations of the individual country policy variables with respect to the 
aggregated policy variables, also support the equity concern model. Even though the 
relevant relationship estimated in section four of Chapter V had wages as the dependent 
variable, it was still the case of an inverse causality connection between wages and 
tariffs.  
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On the other hand, it was observed that: first, the labor-capital ratio entered into the 
wages equation with the same sign as tariffs, and second, the graph in figure 15.F shows 
that the connection among those three variables form an inverted causal fork 
(tariffswage labcap) implying that a correlation between tariffs and the labor capital 
ratio conditional on wages would be different than zero. Those two facts taken together 
could be thought of as supporting the adding machine model since a positive conditional 
correlation between tariffs and labcap would be an argument favoring the hypothesis that 
governments implement higher protection levels to those sectors that employ a 
significant number of workers. A similar analysis applies to import penetration since this 
variable also forms a causal inverted fork with tariffs and wages (tariffs  wages  
impen). The conditional correlation in this case supports the pressure group hypothesis 
since the government will increase protection in response to demands from those in the 
domestic import competing sector. 
  
The lack of industrial data available for some countries for the years after 1996 was an 
important restriction to the possibility of performing the model estimation exercise on 
cross-sectional time-series data. The re-estimation of the models as more data become 
available would be a natural extension of the present study. Also, an unbalanced cross-
sectional time-series analysis could be performed with the data currently available, 
however, this alternative was not considered here since no data at the four digits 
aggregation after 1996 was available for Venezuela whose total output represents around 
33% of the total output of the Andean Community Group.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
POLICY VARIABLES DEFINITION, FIGURES AND TABLES 
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Policy Variables 
 
1) Industry concentration (IC):  
(number of firms in whole economy) / (number of firms in sector i) 
2) Import penetration (IMPPEN):  
(Imports – exports) / total output  
3) The fraction of industry production used as an input in other industries (INPUT):  
(value added) / (total output) 
4) Salaries (WAGES) 
(Cost of labor) / (number of employees) 
5) Intra-industry trade (TRADECTA):  
[1- |exports – imports| / (exports + imports)]*100 
6) Ratio of industry labor with respect to total labor (LABUNION):  
(Number of employees in sector i ) / (total number of employees) 
7) Labor/capital ratio (LABCAP):   
(Number of employees) / (value added –labor costs) 
 
The variables for the individual countries are denoted by adding the first letter of the 
name of the country as a prefix to the name of the variable (e.g. P_Wages: wages for 
Peru). In the case of the aggregated variables the prefix is CAN (e.g. CAN_IMPPEN: 
aggregated import penetration for the CAN members). 
 
The variables in deviation form are denoted by adding the prefix DEV to the name of the 
variable (e.g. B_DEV_Tariff: Deviation of the Bolivia tariff with respect to the CET). 
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Figure 1. Welfare Effect of Economic Integration: 
Formation of a Free Trade Area in Good X
 
Departing from an original situation where a small open economy faces lower prices of 
good X in the international market, the potential gains and loses from regional 
integration are depicted in figure 131. Before the formation of a free trade area the 
situation may be illustrated by the horizontal supply curves that are shifted upwards due 
to the tariff imposed by the country that imports good X. The good is bought from non-
member countries since the level SNM+t (where t corresponds to the tariff implemented 
by the importer country) represents the less expensive price per unit (PX0) for the 
importer country. . Even though, once the free trade area is formed the importer country 
sees a reduction in the price per unit charged on good X (from PX0 to PX1), the new price 
is higher than the one corresponding to the complete elimination of the tariff. This 
situation leads to an increase in welfare related to the creation of trade among member 
countries, which is represented by area (b+d), but it also generates a welfare loss (area e) 
since the potential trade with non-member countries will be diverted to trade with 
member countries. 
                                                 
31
 D and S represent the domestic demand and supply curves, while SM and SNM represent the international 
supply curves from members and non-members of the free trade area regional agreement 
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Figure 2. Average Tariff of The Andean Community Group (1972-2002)
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Figure 3. Exports (by Destiny) of The Andean Community Group (1990-2002)
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Figure 4. Imports (by Origin) of The Andean Community Group (1990-2002)
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Figure 6. Average Imports Growth of The Andean Community Group (1970-2002)
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Figure 8.  Industrial Concentration and Wages Meet the Front Door and Back Door Criterion to Be    
Included in a Regression for the Common Tariff 
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Figure 9.  Directed Acyclical Graphs Representing an Omitted Variable Case 
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Figure 10. Instrumental Variable Case from PC-Algorithm 
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             policy variables to the CET 
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Figure 11. Directed Acyclical Graphs for Common External Tariffs (Sub-Regional Data) 33 
 
                                                 
33
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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Figure 11.  (Continued) 
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Figure 12.34 Directed Acyclical Graphs for Individual Countries Data (Sub-Regional Data) 
 
                                                 
34
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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Figure 12.  (Continued) 
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Figure 13.35 Directed Acyclical Graphs for Pooled Data (Sub-Regional Data) 
 
                                                 
35
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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Figure 14.36 Current and Fitted Values for Wages37 
                                                 
36
 The range of the x axis corresponds to the 1997 observations for the three countries, the middle 
observations (where the forecast is far from the actual values) correspond to wages for Colombia 
37
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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              C. Ecuador               D. Peru 
 
 
Figure 15. 38 Directed Acyclical Graphs for Individual Country Tariff Deviation (Regional Data)  
       
                                                 
38
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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                                  E. Venezuela              F. Pooled Data 
 
 
Figure 15. (Continued) 
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Figure 16. 39 Directed Acyclical Graphs for Individual Country Tariff Deviation (Regional Data) 
        Three Digits Aggregation Level  
 
                                                 
39
 See variables’ definition  on the first page of this appendix 
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                      E. Venezuela     F. Pooled Data 
 
 
Figure 16. (Continued) 
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Table 1. Estimation Results for CET on Policy Variables Based on the Directed Acyclical Graphs Analysis
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant 18.286 0.000 20.388 0.000 14.383 0.000 18.807 0.000
CAN_Wages -1.030 0.000
CAN_TrdCta 0.036 0.020
C_Wages -1.063 0.000
P_IC 49.102 0.027
V_Wages -0.97362 0.000
R_Squared 0.3405 0.2172 0.0816 0.2878
Adj R-Squared 0.3174 0.2037 0.0658 0.2755
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0002 0.0269 0.0000
Number of  Obs 60 60 60 60
CET on 
CAN Policy Variables
CET on 
Colombia Policy Variables
CET on 
Peru Policy Variables
CET on 
Venezuela Policy Variables
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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                          versus CET on Individual Country Policy Variables
Ho: Aggregate H1: Country
Colombia   vs. Aggregate 0.8250 0.0020      Colombia Rejected
Ecuador    vs. Aggregate 0.8320 0.0000      Ecuador Rejected
Peru         vs. Aggregate 0.6420 0.0000      Peru Rejected
Venezuela vs. Aggregate 0.1530 0.0170      Inconclusive at 15.3%
Table 2.  Davidson and Mackinnon J-Test for CET on Aggregate Policy Variables  
P-Value
Decision
 
 
* None of the individual country policy variables were more appropriate regressors compared to 
the aggregate community variables. The only exception is the case of Venezuela, for which 
the results were ambiguous, although only at the 15% level of significance 
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Table 3a.  Individual Country Estimation for Bolivia (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -2.2848 0.0000 0.0011 0.0031
B_DEV_Tariff -0.1221 0.0040
B_DEV_Input 16.6198 0.0080
B_DEV_IC   0.8269 0.1390
B_DEV_ImpPen   -0.0002 0.0003
R_Squared 0.306 0.6160
Prob >chi2 0.0028 0.0000
Number of  Obs 27 27
B_DEV_Wages  
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
B_DEV_LabUnion 
 
 
  * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 3b.  Individual Country Estimation for Bolivia (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -2.1197 0.0000 0.0033 0.3120
B_DEV_LabUnion 11.4988 0.3220
B_DEV_Tariff   -0.1002 0.0080
B_DEV_TrdCta   0.0080 0.0410
B_DEV_ImpPen   -0.0104 0.0010
B_DEV_Wages   0.0017 0.2790
B_DEV_CI   0.8559 0.0000
Instrumented B_DEV_LabUnion B_DEV_Wages
Instruments B_DEV_Tariff B_DEV_TrdCta B_DEV_CI B_DEV_Tariff 
B_DEV_ImpPen B_DEV_CI B_DEV_TrdCta B_DEV_ImpPen
R_Squared 0.37 0.6579
Adj R-squared 0.3242 0.6459
Prob >F 0.0001 0.0000
Number of  Obs 60 60
B_DEV_LabUnion
Instrumental Variables
B_DEV_Wages
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 4a.  Individual Country Estimation for Colombia (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant 0.4355 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000
C_DEV_LabUnion -26.1999 0.0020
C_DEV_ImpPen 0.2598 0.0240
C_DEV_LabCap 0.1943 0.0040
C_DEV_LabUnion 0.8894 0.0000
C_DEV_TrdCta -0.0002 0.0000
R_Squared 0.4282 0.7897
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Number of  Obs 27 27
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
C_DEV_Wages C_DEV_CI
 
 
       * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 4b.  Individual Country Estimation for Colombia  (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant 0.0007 0.1240 0.0009 0.0680
C_DEV_LabUnion 0.6478165 0.0050
C_DEV_LabCap 0.1057732 0.0510
C_DEV_CI 0.4404 0.0840
C_DEV_Wages -0.0021 0.0310
C_DEV_Input 0.1787 0.0280
Instrumented C_DEV_LabUnion C_DEV_CI
Instruments C_DEV_LabCap C_DEV_Wages C_DEV_Wages C_DEV_Input
C_DEV_Input C_DEV_LabCap
R_Squared 0.646 0.7106
Adj R-squared 0.6335 0.6951
Prob >F 0.0000 0.0000
Number of  Obs 60 60
Instrumental Variables
C_DEV_CI C_DEV_LabUnion
 
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 5a.  Individual Country Estimation for Ecuador (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -1.0962 0.0000 -18.3804 0.0010 -0.0002 0.9150
E_DEV_Tariff 0.2187 0.0080
E_DEV_Input 16.0698 0.0130
E_DEV_ImpPen -0.0217 0.0250
E_DEV_LabCap 67.83715 0.1460
E_DEV_LabUnion -688.5813 0.0190
E_DEV_IC 1.1542 0.0000
R_Squared 0.4256 0.3038 0.5475
Prob >chi2 0.0002 0.0071 0
Number of  Obs 26 26 26
E_DEV_Wages E_DEV_TrdCta E_DEV_LU     
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 5b.  Individual Country Estimation for Ecuador  (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -1.0327 0.0000 -0.0011 0.2800
E_DEV_Wages 0.1381842 0.0800
E_DEV_ImpPen -0.0138657 0.0010
E_DEV_CI 0.9417 0.0000
E_DEV_TrdCta -0.0001 0.0200
R_Squared 0 0.0000
Adj R-squared 0 0.0000
Prob >F 0.0037 0.0000
Number of  Obs 60 60
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
E_DEV_Tariff E_DEV_LabUnion
 
 
  * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 6a.  Pooled Data Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.4503 0.0010 0.0360 0.0140 0.0000 1.0000
rg_dev_labcap -3.9988 0.0000
rg_dev_input 8.1614 0.2030
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0135 0.0020
rg_dev_imppen -0.0251 0.0540
rg_dev_tariff -0.0071 0.0420
rg_dev_imppen 0.0041 0.0010
rg_dev_ci 0.9326701 0.0000
R_Squared 0.3345 0.1775 0.5830
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0002 0
Number of  Obs 81 81 81
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
rg_dev_wages rg_dev_labcap rg_dev_labunion
 
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 6b.  Pooled Data Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.4423 0.0090 0.0001 0.8650
rg_dev_tariff 0.0639 0.0990
rg_dev_labcap -0.6942 0.0040
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0119 0.0060
rg_dev_imppen -0.0114 0.0010
rg_dev_ci 0.8653 0.0000
rg_dev_input 0.1406 0.0010
R_Squared 0.1727 0.6061
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Number of  Obs 180 180
Seemingly Unrrelated Estimation
Eq_Wages Eq_LabUnion
 
 
   * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 7.   Hausman Test for Random vs. Fixed Effects Models for Wages and Labor Union                                                                                               
                 (Sub-Regional Pooled Data)
Hausman Model
Aggregation   Model Explanatory Variable     Random Effects Fixed Effects Statistic P-value Chosen
3 Digits
Wages
    rg_dev_labcap -3.97076 0.40360 Fixed
    rg_dev_imppen -0.02646 -0.02281 98.790 0.000 Effects
    rg_dev_trdcta 0.01346 0.00024
    rg_dev_input 9.00359 12.97484
Labor Union Random
    rg_dev_ci 0.93403 0.93403 0.000 1.000 Effects
4 Digits
Wages
    rg_dev_labcap -0.38760 -0.69820
    rg_dev_imppen -0.00898 -0.01146 44.960 0.000 Fixed
    rg_dev_trdcta 0.00513 0.01189 Effects
    rg_dev_tariff -0.03871 0.06293
Labor Union
    rg_dev_ci 0.86473 0.86483 0.020 0.991 Random
    rg_dev_input 0.14337 0.14258 Effects
Estimator
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 8.  Panel Data Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.8760 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
rg_dev_lacap 0.4036 0.6560
rg_dev_input 12.9748 0.0060
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0002 0.9430
rg_dev_imppen -0.0228 0.0150
rg_dev_ci 0.9340 0.0000
R_Squared
  Within 0.1731 0.5830
  Between 0.9109 0.5694
  Overall 0.1267 0.5830
Prob >F 0.0065
Prob > chi2 0.0000
F test that all u_i=0:
   Prob > F = 0.0000 0.0065
Number of  Obs 81 81
Number of groups 3 3
Obs per group 27 27
rg_dev_wages rg_dev_labunion
Fixed Effect Model Random Effects Model 
 
 
  * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 9.  Panel Data Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.8720 0.0000 0.0001 0.8650
rg_dev_tariff -0.0387 0.3600
rg_dev_labcap -0.3876 0.0860
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0051 0.2000
rg_dev_imppen -0.0090 0.0040
rg_dev_ci 0.8648 0.0000
rg_dev_input 0.1426 0.0010
R_Squared
  Within 0.081 0.6062
  Between 0.731 0.5595
  Overall 0.1186 0.6061
Prob >F 0.0054            -
Prob > chi2      - 0.0000
F test that all u_i=0:
   Prob > F = 0.0000 0.0000           -
Number of  Obs 180 180
Number of groups 3 3
Obs per group 60 60
Fixed Effect Model Random Effects Model 
rg_dev_wages rg_dev_labunion
 
 
        * See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 10a.  Straw Man  Model Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.3343 0.0310 0.0049 0.7420 0.0014 0.4310
rg_dev_tariff -0.0139 0.7080
rg_dev_labcap -6.6770 0.0000
rg_dev_ci -17.7143 0.1630
rg_dev_input 5.3341 0.4140
rg_dev_labunion 17.8196 0.0850
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0146 0.0010
rg_dev_imppen -0.0133 0.3130
rg_dev_tariff -0.0053 0.1140
rg_dev_wages -0.0577 0.0000
rg_dev_ci 0.6479 0.5850
rg_dev_input 0.0124 0.9840
rg_dev_labunion -0.7938 0.4130
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0011 0.0140
rg_dev_imppen 0.0016 0.1970
rg_dev_tariff -0.0003 0.3780
rg_dev_wages 0.0020 0.0850
rg_dev_labcap -0.0103 0.4130
rg_dev_ci 0.9136 0.0000
rg_dev_input 0.0642 0.3540
rg_dev_trdqta 0.0000 0.5480
rg_dev_imppen 0.0000 0.9930
R_Squared 0.2833 0.2508 0.6055
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of  Obs 81 81 81
Straw Man Model
rg_dev_wages rg_dev_labcap rg_dev_labunion
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Table 10b.  Straw Man Model  Estimation (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables
Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.3820 0.0250 0.0463 0.3680 0.0001 0.8400
rg_dev_tariff 0.0555 0.1550
rg_dev_labcap -1.3142 0.0000
rg_dev_ci -23.8989 0.2550
rg_dev_input 5.3428 0.6400
rg_dev_labunion 24.1798 0.1900
rg_dev_trdcta 0.0113 0.0090
rg_dev_imppen -0.0099 0.0040
rg_dev_tariff -0.0030 0.8010
rg_dev_wages -0.1175 0.0000
rg_dev_ci 0.0636 0.9920
rg_dev_input -0.1735 0.9600
rg_dev_labunion -1.0885 0.8440
rg_dev_trdcta 0.0011 0.3960
rg_dev_imppen 0.0008 0.4510
rg_dev_tariff -0.0001 0.5000
rg_dev_wages 0.0004 0.1900
rg_dev_labcap -0.0002 0.8440
rg_dev_ci 0.8657 0.0000
rg_dev_input 0.1400 0.0020
rg_dev_trdcta 0.0000 0.7710
rg_dev_imppen 0.0000 0.9610
R_Squared 0.1462 0.0448 0.6074
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0
Number of  Obs 180 180 180
Straw Man Model
rg_dev_wages rg_dev_labcap rg_dev_labunion
 
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 11.  Forecast Evaluation (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
   Estimation Dep. Variable MSE RMSE MAE MAPE WAPE
Individual Country
Bol_Wages 4.3529 2.0864 1.8455 107.0011 1.1116
Bol_LabUnion 0.0005 0.0230 0.0163 1428.9805 -21971096
Col_Wages 0.3039 0.5513 0.4476 81.1777 0.8850
Ecu_Wages 5.1881 2.2777 2.1053 119.5419 1.1589
Ecu_LabUnion 0.0003 0.0161 0.0095 213.4720 55123104
Pooled Data - SUR
Bol_Wages 0.7136 0.8447 0.6700 44.0135 0.3566
Bol_LabUnion 0.0002 0.0143 0.0103 1524.2269 8909286
Col_Wages 0.9742 0.9870 0.8925 214.1488 1.7647
Ecu_Wages 1.4600 1.2083 0.9819 62.3884 0.4706
Ecu_LabUnion 0.0001 0.0104 0.0071 235.1285 -17984478
Pooled Data - Panel
Bol_Wages 1.0024 1.0012 0.7051 33.3781 0.4197
Bol_LabUnion 0.0002 0.0140 0.0097 1483.0941 5402145
Col_Wages 1.9904 1.4108 1.3448 360.1383 2.6591
Ecu_Wages 1.3144 1.1465 0.9493 60.6843 0.4649
Ecu_LabUnion 0.0001 0.0103 0.0068 228.0132 -11958737
Pooled Data - Straw Man
Bol_Wages 71.1653 8.4359 2.4954 194.2606 1.4452
Bol_LabUnion 0.0004 0.0193 0.0118 2781.3178 -499465
Col_Wages 0.7657 0.8750 0.7723 186.9048 1.5271
Ecu_Wages 1.5282 1.2362 1.0393 64.2263 0.5020
Ecu_LabUnion 0.0001 0.0102 0.0071 168.2868 -16606889
Forecast Evaluation Measures
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 12.  Forecast Evaluation (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
     Estimation Dep. Variable MSE RMSE MAE MAPE WAPE
Individual Country
Bol_Wages 11.01357 3.31867 2.97593 182.2517 1.5588
Bol_LabUnion 0.00030 0.01737 0.01427 513.4796 -36385528
Col_LabUnion 0.00001 0.00384 0.00262 347.1427 -55826580
Ecu_LabUnion 0.00014 0.01162 0.00641 185.9593 -12354432
Pooled Data - SUR
Bol_Wages 2.42537 1.55736 1.15302 94.3798 0.4434
Bol_LabUnion 0.00008 0.00912 0.00627 149.0126 7079587
Col_LabUnion 0.00000 0.00199 0.00147 156.5959 -12401479
Ecu_LabUnion 0.00006 0.00771 0.00498 338.6476 4186758
Pooled Data - Panel
Bol_Wages 2.55529 1.59853 1.24977 75.6815 0.5203
Bol_LabUnion 0.00008 0.00912 0.00627 149.0726 7110289
Col_LabUnion 0.00000 0.00199 0.00147 156.3624 -12488522
Ecu_LabUnion 0.00006 0.00772 0.00498 340.0092 4200740
Pooled Data - Straw Man
Bol_Wages 2.265259 1.50508 1.11909 83.7580 0.4547
Bol_LabUnion 0.000082 0.00904 0.00618 151.3334 7256244
Col_LabUnion 0.000004 0.00207 0.00154 150.8058 -13779952
Ecu_LabUnion 0.000058 0.00762 0.00481 323.3804 5729130
Forecast Evaluation Measures
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 13.  Model Chosen Based on the Mean Absolute Percentage Error  (Sub-Regional Data)
Agregation Estimation Bol_Wages Bol_LabUnion Col_Wages Col_LabUnion Ecu_Wages Ecu_LabUnion
Three Digits Individual V V NA
Region NA
Longitudinal V NA V
Straw Man NA V
Four Digits Individual NA NA V
Region V NA NA
Longitudinal V V NA NA
Straw Man NA V NA
Model
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 14 .  Diebold Mariano Tests for Forecasting Evaluation  (Sub-Regional Data - Three Digits)
Model Estimation MSE Difference S(1) Statistic p-value  Model Chosen
Bol_Wages
I vs R 3.779325 5.572574 0.000000 Region
I vs P 3.479434 6.714834 0.000000 Panel
I vs S 3.395358 4.349449 0.000014 Straw Man
R vs P -0.299891 -1.520761 0.128320 None
R vs S -45.599144 -1.027697 0.304092 None
S vs P 0.084076 0.262831 0.792680 None
Bol_LabUnion
I vs R 0.000323 1.670010 0.094917 Region
I vs P 0.000346 1.731374 0.083385 Panel
I vs S 0.000155 0.570117 0.568598 None
R vs P 0.000000 -0.733422 0.463301 None
R vs S -0.000168 -0.928883 0.352950 None
S vs P 0.000178 0.944208 0.345063 None
Col_Wages
I vs R -0.686597 -5.401831 0.000000 Individual
I vs P -1.751661 -12.283724 0.000000 Individual
I vs S -0.461708 -3.820936 0.000133 Individual
R vs P -1.055317 -9.765901 0.000000 Region
R vs S 0.224889 7.936408 0.000000 Straw Man
S vs P -1.285904 -10.194627 0.000000 Straw Man
Ecu_Wages
I vs R 3.718799 4.599630 0.000004 Region
I vs P 3.765582 4.680715 0.000003 Panel
I vs S 3.659890 4.720934 0.000002 Straw Man
R vs P 0.151208 1.098713 0.271893 None
R vs S -0.058909 -0.600272 0.548325 None
S vs P 0.153122 1.058979 0.289609 None
Ecu_LabUnion
I vs R 0.000152 1.004201 0.315282 None
I vs P 0.000160 1.016504 0.309389 None
I vs S 0.000157 0.965763 0.334163 None
R vs P 0.000000 0.283634 0.776691 None
R vs S 0.000005 0.320726 0.748418 None
S vs P -0.000005 -0.293897 0.768837 None
*(H0: difference is not significant)
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 15.  Diebold Mariano Tests for Forecasting Evaluation  (Sub-Regional Data - Four Digits)
Model Estimation MSE Difference S(1) Statistic p-value  Model Chosen
Bol_Wages
I vs R 8.5882036 6.0918320 0.0000000 Region
I vs P 8.4582880 6.7438339 0.0000000 Panel
I vs S 8.7483153 6.1936282 0.0000000 StrawMan
R vs P -0.1299155 -0.4056497 0.6850000 None
R vs S 0.1601117 2.3480431 0.0188723 StrawMan
S vs P -0.2900272 -0.9255664 0.3546714 None
Bol_LabUnion
I vs R 0.0002185 2.3385779 0.0193573 Region
I vs P 0.0002185 2.3382935 0.0193720 Panel
I vs S 0.0002199 2.3604597 0.0182523 StrawMan
R vs P 0.0000000 -0.1895654 0.8496497 None
R vs S 0.0000014 0.9068534 0.3644843 None
S vs P -0.0000015 -0.9268132 0.3540235 None
Col_Wages
I vs R 0.0000108 2.5858780 0.0097131 Region
I vs P 0.0000108 2.5862248 0.0097034 Panel
I vs S 0.0000105 2.5400509 0.0110836 StrawMan
R vs P 0.0000000 -0.0127228 0.9898490 None
R vs S -0.0000003 -1.7010448 0.0889346 Region
S vs P 0.0000003 1.7173303 0.0859188 Panel
Ecu_LabUnion
I vs R 0.0000108 1.1135427 0.2654754 None
I vs P 0.0000107 1.0985419 0.2719679 None
I vs S 0.0000767 1.1748971 0.2400359 None
R vs P -0.0000001 -0.8539945 0.3931080 None
R vs S 0.0000007 0.8755802 0.3812583 None
S vs P -0.0000008 -1.0346311 0.3008412 None
*(H0: difference is not significant)
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 16.   Hausman Test for Random vs. Fixed Effects Models for Wages and Labor Union                                                                                               
(Regional Pooled Data)
Model Explanatory Variable Random Effects Fixed Effects Hausman statistic p-value Model chosen
Wages
rg_dev_labcap -0.52326 -0.44503
rg_dev_imppen -0.00774 -0.00719 51.8200 0.0000 Fixed Effects
rg_dev_tariffs -0.04168 -0.07056
Labor Union
rg_dev_ci 0.43248 0.43220
rg_dev_input 0.28330 0.28743 0.3300 0.8469 Random Effects
Estimator
 
* See variables’ definition on the first page of this appendix 
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Table 17.  Panel Data Estimation for Wages (Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob
Constant -0.4637 0.0000
rg_dev_tariff -0.0706 0.0660
rg_dev_labcap -0.4450 0.1000
rg_dev_imppen -0.0072 0.0440
R_Squared
  Within 0.0362
  Between 0.1273
  Overall 0.0085
Prob >F 0.0129
F test that all u_i=0:
   Prob > F = 0.0000 0.0000
Number of  Obs 300
Number of groups 5
Obs per group 60
Fixed Effects Model Estimation for Wages 
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Table 18.  Panel Data Estimation for Labor Union (Regional Data - Four Digits)
Variables Coefficient Prob
Constant 0.0001 0.7180
rg_dev_ic 0.4325 0.0000
rg_dev_input 0.2833 0.0000
R_Squared
  Within 0.4408
  Between 0.0575
  Overall 0.4397
Prob > chi2 0
Number of  Obs 300
Number of groups 5
Obs per group 60
Random-Effects Model Estimation for Labor Union
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APPENDIX B 
  
CONVERSION TABLES FOR DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATIONS
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of Revision 3
CODE CODE
3111 Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat 1511
3112 Manufacture of dairy products 1520
3113 Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 1513
3114 Canning, preserving and processing of fish, crustaceans and similar foods 1512
3115 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 1514
3116 Grain mill products 1531
3117 Manufacture of bakery products 1541
3118 Sugar factories and refineries 1542
3119 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1543
3121 Manufacture of food products not classified elsewhere 1532+1544+1549
3122 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 1533
3131 Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits 1551
3132 Wine industries 1552
3133 Malt liquors and malt 1553
3134 Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 1554
3140 Tobacco manufactures 1600
3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 1711+1712
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel 1721
3213 Knitting mills 1730
3214 Manufacture of carpets and rugs 1722
3215 Cordage, rope and twine industries 1723
3219* Manufacture of textiles not classified elsewhere 1729
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear 1810
3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 1911
3232 Fur dressing and dyeing industries 1820
3233 Manufacture of products of leather and leather substitutes, except footwear 
and wearing apparel 1912
3240 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or plastic footwear 1920
Table 19. International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of Revision 3
CODE CODE
3311 Sawmills, planing and other wood mills 2010+2021+2022
3312 Manufacture of wooden and cane containers and small cane ware 2023
3319* Manufacture of wood and cork products not classified elsewhere 2029
3320+3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal 3610
3411 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 2101
3412 Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper and paperboard 2102
3419* Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard articles not classified elsewhere 2109
3420 Printing, publishing and allied industries 2211..2219+2221..2222
3511 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers 2411+2330
3512 Manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides 2412+2421
3513 Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made fibres 
except glass 2413+2430
3521 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and lacquers 2422
3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines 2423
3523 Manufacture of soap and cleaning, preparations, perfumes, cosmetics and 
other toilet preparations 2424
3529* Manufacture of chemical products not classified elsewhere 2429
3530 Petroleum refineries 2320
3540 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 2310
3551 Tyre and tube industries 2511
3559 Manufacture of rubber products not classified elsewhere 2519
3560 Manufacture of plastic products not classified elsewhere 2520
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 2691
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 2610
3691 Manufacture of structural clay products 2693
3692 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 2694
3699* Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products not classified elsewhere 2692+2695..2699
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 2710+2731
3720 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 2720+2732
Table 19. (Continued)
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of Revision 3
CODE CODE
3811 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 2893
3812+3320 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 3610
3813 Manufacture of structural metal products 2811
3819* Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment 
not classified elsewhere 2891+2892+2899+2812
3821 Manufacture of engines and turbines 2911
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment 2921
3823 Manufacture of metal and wood-working machinery 2923
3824 Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment except metal and 
wood-working machinery 2813+2922+2924..2926
3825 Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery 3000
3829 Machinery and equipment except electrical not classified elsewhere 2912..2919+2927+2929
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 3110..3120+3210
3832 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 3220+3230+2230
3833 Manufacture of electrical appliances and household goods 2930
3839 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies not classified elsewhere 3130..3190
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 3511+3512
3842 Manufacture of railroad equipment 3520
3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles 3410..3430
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 3591+3592
3845 Manufacture of aircraft 3530
3849 Manufacture of transport equipment not classified elsewhere 3599
3851 Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and controlling 
equipment, not classified elsewhere 3311+3312+3313
3852 Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 3320
3853 Manufacture of watches and clocks 3330
3901 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 3691
3902 Manufacture of musical instruments 3692
3903 Manufacture of sporting and athletic goods 3693
3909 Manufacturing industries not classified elsewhere 3694+3699
Table 19. (Continued)
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of NALADISA
CODE CODE
3111 Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat 1601+1602
3112 Manufacture of dairy products 0401..0406
3113 Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 2001..2105
3114 Canning, preserving and processing of fish, crustaceans and 
similar foods 1603..1605
3115 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 1501..1522
3116 Grain mill products 1901..1904
3117 Manufacture of bakery products 1905
3118 Sugar factories and refineries 1701..1703
3119 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1704..1806
3121 Manufacture of food products not classified elsewhere 2106+2209+2501
3122 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 2308+2309
3131 Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits 2207+2208
3132 Wine industries 2204+2205
3133 Malt liquors and malt 2203
3134 Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 2201+2202+2206
3140 Tobacco manufactures 2401..2403
3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
5001..5007+5101..5113+5201..5212+5301..5313+     
5401..5408+5501..5516+5601..5603+5801..5807+     
5901..5907
3212 Manufacture of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel 6301..6309
3213 Knitting mills 6001..6006+6107..6117
3214 Manufacture of carpets and rugs 5701..5705
3215 Cordage, rope and twine industries 5604..5609+5908+5808+6310
3219* Manufacture of textiles not classified elsewhere 5809..5811+5909..5911
3220 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear 4203+4303+6101..6106+6201..6217+6501..6507
3231 Tanneries and leather finishing 4101..4103
3232 Fur dressing and dyeing industries 4104..4115
3233 Manufacture of products of leather and leather substitutes, 
except footwear and wearing apparel 4201..4202+4204..4205+4301..4302+4304
Table 20. Conversion Table for the ISIC (Revision 2) and NALADISA Classifications
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of NALADISA
CODE CODE
3240 Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanized or moulded 
rubber or plastic footwear 6403..6406
3311 Sawmills, planing and other wood mills 4401..4413
3312 Manufacture of wooden and cane containers and small cane 
ware
4414..4420+4601..4602
3319* Manufacture of wood and cork products not classified 
elsewhere 4421+4501..4504
3320+3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of 
metal 9401..9403
3411 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 4701..4707+4801..4816
3412 Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper and paperboard 4819
3419* Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard articles not 
classified elsewhere 4817..4818+4820..4823
3420 Printing, publishing and allied industries 4901..4911
3511 Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers 2801..2851+2901..2935+2942+3507
3512 Manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides 3101..3105+3808
3513 Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-
made fibres except glass 3901..3916
3521 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and lacquers 3201..3215+3809
3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines 2936..2941+3001..3006
3523 Manufacture of soap and cleaning, preparations, perfumes, 
cosmetics and other toilet preparations 3301..3307+3401
3529* Manufacture of chemical products not classified elsewhere 3402..3407+3501..3506+3601..3606+3803..3807+       3810..3815+3817..3825
3530 Petroleum refineries 2709..2713
3540 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 2701..2708+2714..2715+3801..3802
3551 Tyre and tube industries 4009+4011..4013
3559 Manufacture of rubber products not classified elsewhere 4001..4008+4010+4014..4017+6401..6402
3560 Manufacture of plastic products not classified elsewhere 3917..3926
3610 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 6911..6914
3620 Manufacture of glass and glass products 7001..7020
3691 Manufacture of structural clay products 6901..6910
3692 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 2520..2523+3816+6809..6810
3699* Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products not classified 
elsewhere
2502..2519+2524..2530+6701..6704+6801..6808+   
6811..6815
Table 20. (Continued)
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4-digit level 4-digit level 
of Revision 2 INDUSTRY of NALADISA
CODE CODE
3710 Iron and steel basic industries 2601+7201..7229+7301..7307
3720 Non-ferrous metal basic industries 2602..2621+7401..7407+7501..7507+7601..7609+  7801..7805+7901..7906+8001..8006+8101..8112
3811 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 8201..8215
3812+3320 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 9401..9403
3813 Manufacture of structural metal products 7308..7310+7610..7612
3819* Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery 
and equipment not classified elsewhere
7311..7326+7408..7419+7508+7613..7616+7806+      
7907+8007+8301..8311+  8481
3821 Manufacture of engines and turbines 8401..8412
3822 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment 8432..8438
3823 Manufacture of metal and wood-working machinery 8454..8463+8465
3824 Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment 
except metal and wood-working machinery
8413..8431+ 8444..8453+8464+ 
8466..8468+8474..8475+8477..8478
3825 Manufacture of office, computing and accounting machinery 8439..8443+8469..8473
3829 Machinery and equipment except electrical not classified 
elsewhere 8476+8479..8485+9302..9305+9307
3831 Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and apparatus 8501..8508+8514..8515
3832 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 8517..8531
3833 Manufacture of electrical appliances and household goods 8509..8510+8516
3839 Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies not classified 
elsewhere 8511..8513+8532..8548
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 8901..8908
3842 Manufacture of railroad equipment 8601..8608
3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles 8701..8710
3844 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 8711..8712
3845 Manufacture of aircraft 8801+8805
3849 Manufacture of transport equipment not classified elsewhere 8609+8713..8716
3851 Manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and 
controlling equipment, not classified elsewhere 9014..9033
3852 Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 3701..3707+9001..9013
3853 Manufacture of watches and clocks 9101..9114
3901 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 7101..7117
3902 Manufacture of musical instruments 9201..9209
3903 Manufacture of sporting and athletic goods 9506..9507
3909 Manufacturing industries not classified elsewhere 6601..6603+6701..6702+9301+9306+9404..9406+   9501..9505+9508+9601..9618+9701..9705
Table 20. (Continued)
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